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A	  PATH	  TOWARD	  AN	  INCREASED	  ROLE	  FOR	  THE	  UNITED	  
STATES	  IN	  PATENT	  INFRINGEMENT	  LITIGATION	  
CAROLINE	  M.	  TURNER*	  
A	  number	  of	  major	  statutory	  schemes	  implicate	  federal	  interests	  but	  
do	  not	  provide	   for	  explicit	  authority	   for	   the	  United	  States	   to	  bring	   law-­‐
suits	  for	  damages	  or	  to	  obtain	  injunctive	  relief.	  The	  patent	  statutes	  pro-­‐
vide	   that	   the	   patentee	  may	   sue	   in	   the	   case	   of	   infringement,	   and	   court	  
decisions	  have	  extended	   that	   right	   to	  certain	   licensees.	  Accordingly,	   the	  
United	  States	  has	  participated	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  a	  co-­‐patentee	  or	  
licensee	  only	  as	  an	  amicus.	  Yet	  the	  government	  arguably	  has	  an	  interest	  
in	   intervening	   in	   or	   instituting,	   as	   a	   co-­‐plaintiff,	   infringement	   cases	   in-­‐
volving	   certain	   patents.	   Recent	   scholarship	   has	   renewed	   attention	   on	  
whether,	   and	   to	   what	   extent,	   the	   United	   States	   may	   broadly	   assert	   a	  
cause	  of	  action	  that	  is	  implied	  from	  a	  statute	  or	  is	  based	  on	  an	  inherent,	  
non-­‐statutory	   authority.	   The	   Supreme	   Court’s	   current	   intolerance	   of	  
rights	  implied	  from	  statutes	  in	  cases	  brought	  by	  private	  litigants	  means	  
that	  the	  government	  must	  rely	  on	  a	  different	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  potential-­‐
ly	   succeed	   in	  asserting	  a	  cause	  of	  action.	  Because	   the	  United	  States	  has	  
frequently	   argued	   that	   a	   unique	   standard	   for	   implying	   a	   right	   to	   sue	  
from	  a	  statute	  should	  apply	  when	  the	  government	  is	  a	  plaintiff,	  this	  arti-­‐
cle	   focuses	   on	   the	   most-­‐invoked	   decision,	   Wyandotte	   Transportation	  
Company	  v.	  United	  States.	  	  It	  concludes	  that	  Wyandotte	  is	  a	  fragile	  cor-­‐
nerstone	   for	   actions	   beyond	   suits	   to	   recover	   pecuniary	   loss	   or	   remedy	  
damage	   to	   government	   property.	   The	   article	   then	   turns	   to	   a	   little-­‐
understood	   but	   broad	   authority	   that	   is	   not	   dependent	   on	   implication	  
from	   a	   statute	   but	   rather	   rests	   on	   sovereignty	   and	   the	   effectuation	   of	  
important	   federal	   interests.	   It	   suggests	   that	   this	  power,	  which	  has	  been	  
referenced	   in	   several	   Supreme	   Court	   decisions	   and	   argued	   in	   several	  
contexts,	   should	   be	   examined	   anew	  as	   a	   basis	   for	   claims	   by	   the	  United	  
States	  in	  cases	  involving	  patent	  infringement.	  
INTRODUCTION	  
“The	  United	  States	  has	  a	  strong	  interest,	  encompassing	  a	  variety	  of	  
perspectives,	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   judicial	   remedies	   for	   patent	   infringe-­‐
486	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  
ment.”1	  The	  Solicitor	  General	   files	  amicus	  briefs	   in	  the	  Federal	  Circuit	  
and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	   in	  patent	  cases,	  sometimes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  re-­‐
quest	   for	   views2	   and	   in	   others	   at	   the	   government’s	   own	   initiative.3	  
These	  briefs	   are	   submitted	  as	   a	   result	   of	   extensive	   coordination	  with	  
the	  U.S.	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Office	  (PTO)	  and	  numerous	  other	  agen-­‐
cies4	  and	  have	  often	  significantly	  influenced	  the	  courts5	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  
issues,	  including	  infringement	  standards.6	  In	  addition,	  the	  Commercial	  
Litigation	  Branch,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Section	  of	  the	  Civil	  Division	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice	  (DOJ)	  represents	  the	  United	  States	  when	  
the	   government	   is	   a	   patent	   holder	   or	   licensee,	   both	   offensively	   and	  
defensively.7	  
But	   the	  government	  does	  not	  bring	   infringement	  actions	  as	  a	  co-­‐
plaintiff	  or	  intervenor	  in	  cases	  brought	  by	  owners	  of	  patents	  when	  the	  
United	  States	  is	  not	  a	  co-­‐owner	  or	  licensee	  (hereinafter,	  a	  “private	  pa-­‐
tent”).	   Although	   there	   are	   apparently	   no	   reported	   instances	   in	  which	  
the	   United	   States	   has	   sought	   to	   file	   or	   join	   such	   a	   lawsuit	   as	   a	   co-­‐
plaintiff	   in	   a	  district	   court	  when	   it	  was	  not	   an	   indispensable	  party,	   it	  
did	  unsuccessfully	  seek	  to	  bring	  an	  action	  under	  an	  implied	  right	  theo-­‐
ry	  to	  secure	  invalidation	  of	  a	  patent.8	  The	  reason	  why	  such	  suits	  have	  
not	  been	  brought	  or	   joined	  seems	  simple	  enough:	   the	  patent	   statutes	  
specifically	  provide	  that	  the	  patentee	  may	  bring	  an	  action	  to	  redress	  an	  
infringement.9	  The	  sparse	   legislative	  history	  shows	  no	   indication	   that	  
	  
	   	  *	  J.D.	  candidate	  2016,	  Columbia	  Law	  School.	  
	   1.	   	  Brief	   for	   the	  United	   States	   as	  Amicus	   Curiae	   Supporting	  Respondent	   at	   1,	   eBay	   Inc.	   v.	  
MercExchange,	  L.L.C.,	  547	  U.S.	  388	  (2006)	  (No.	  05-­‐130).	  
	   2.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Brief	   for	   the	   United	   States	   as	   Amicus	   Curiae,	   Sony	   Computer	   Entertainment	  
America	  LLC	  v.	  1st	  Media,	  LLC,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  418	  (2013)	  (No.	  12-­‐1086).	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  prac-­‐
tice,	  see	  J.	  Jonas	  Anderson,	  Patent	  Dialogue,	  92	  N.C.	  L.	  REV.	  1049,	  1080	  (2014).	  	  	  
	   3.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Brief	   for	   the	   United	   States	   as	   Amicus	   Curiae	   Supporting	   Neither	   Party,	   Teva	  
Pharmaceuticals	   USA,	   Inc.	   v.	   Sandoz,	   Inc.,	   No.	   13-­‐854	   (U.S.	   June	   18,	   2014),	   2014	  WL	   2769084;	  
Brief	   for	   the	  United	   States	   as	   Amicus	   Curiae	   Supporting	   Petitioner,	   Octane	   Fitness,	   LLC	   v.	   Icon	  
Health	  &	  Fitness,	  Inc.,	  134	  S.	  Ct.	  1749	  (2013)	  (No.	  12–1184).	  	  
	   4.	   	  See	   Paul	  R.	  Gugliuzza,	  Saving	   the	  Federal	  Circuit,	   13	  CHI.-­‐KENT	   J.	   INTELL.	  PROP.	  350,	  358	  
(2014)	  (“[T]he	  Solicitor	  General	  does	  not	  act	  alone	  when	  formulating	  the	  position	  of	  the	  United	  
States.”);	  Arti	  K.	  Rai,	  Competing	  With	  the	  “Patent	  Court”:	  A	  Newly	  Robust	  Ecosystem,	  13	  CHI.-­‐KENT	  J.	  
INTELL.	  PROP.	  386,	  390	  (2014)	  (“[T]he	  Solicitor	  General	  represents	  not	  simply	  the	  PTO,	  but	  also	  a	  
number	  of	  other	  agencies	  with	  interests	  in	  patent	  questions.”).	  
	   5.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Paul	  R.	  Gugliuzza,	   IP	   Injury	  and	   the	   Institutions	  of	  Patent	  Law,	  98	   IOWA	  L.	  REV.	  
747,	  766	  (2013)	   (“enormous	   influence”);	   John	  F.	  Duffy,	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	   in	   the	  Shadow	  of	   the	  
Solicitor	  General,	  78	  GEO.	  WASH.	  L.	  REV.	  518,	  540-­‐44	  (2010)	  (compiling	  statistics).	  	  
	   6.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Festo	   Corp.	   v.	   Shoketsu	   Kinzoku	   Kogyo	   Kabushiki	   Co.,	   535	   U.S.	   722,	   731-­‐41	  
(2002)	  (adopting	  view	  advanced	  by	  Solicitor	  General).	  	  
	   7.	   	  Commercial	   Litigation	   Branch,	   Intellectual	   Property	   Section,	   U.S.	   Dep’t	   of	   Justice,	  
http://www.justice.gov/civil/intellectual-­‐property-­‐section	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  17,	  2015).	  
	   8.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corp.,	  717	  F.2d	  775,	  786	  (3d	  Cir.	  1983).	  	  
	   9.	   	  35	   U.S.C.	   §	   281	   (2012).	   Accordingly,	   the	   patentee	   is,	   as	   a	   prudential	   requirement,	   an	  
indispensable	  party	  in	  a	  lawsuit	  alleging	  infringement	  of	  the	  patent.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Indep.	  Wireless	  Tel.	  
Co.	  v.	  Radio	  Corp.	  of	  Am.,	  269	  U.S.	  459,	  461	  (1926).	  A	  licensee	  may	  sue	  if	  it	  holds	  “all	  substantial	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Congress,	  in	  any	  iteration	  of	  the	  statutes,	  considered	  whether	  the	  Unit-­‐
ed	   States	   should	   have	   a	   right	   to	   bring	   actions	   as	   a	   co-­‐plaintiff,	  much	  
less	  endorsed	  such	  claims.10	  Any	  such	  lawsuit	  would,	  then,	  be	  depend-­‐
ent	  upon	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  government	  has	  either	  an	  implied	  statu-­‐
tory	  or	  an	  inherent	  right.	  
The	  established	  orthodoxy,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  pronouncements	  
on	   the	   desirability	   of	   such	   actions,11	   is	   undoubtedly	   that	   such	   claims	  
are	   either	   not	   in	   furtherance	   of	   an	   important	   federal	   objective	   or	  
would	   surely	   be	   unsuccessful,	   or	   both.	   This	   article	   argues	   that	   these	  
assumptions	  are	  questionable	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  revisited.	  While	  the	  path	  
to	  judicial	  recognition	  of	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  to	  address	  infringements	  of	  
private	  party	  patents	  is	  not	  obstacle-­‐free,	  the	  journey	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  
furtherance	  of	  strategic	  technological	  and	  innovation	  objectives.12	  This	  
article	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  define	  with	  specificity	   the	  types	  or	  categories	  
of	   patents	   that	   the	   United	   States,	   acting	   through	   the	   Civil	   Division,13	  
	  
rights”	   to	   the	   patent.	   Textile	   Prods.,	   Inc.	   v.	   Mead	   Corp.,	   134	   F.3d	   1481,	   1484	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   1998).	  
When	  a	  federal	  agency	  patent	  owner	  grants	  either	  an	  exclusive	  or	  a	  non-­‐exclusive	  license,	  it	  may	  
under	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  Act,	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  207(a)(2)	  (2012),	  in	  its	  discretion	  authorize	  the	  licensee	  to	  
bring	  an	  infringement	  action	  on	  its	  own	  behalf	  “without	  joining	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  party.”	  35	  
C.F.R.	  §	  404.5(b)(2).	  In	  such	  cases,	  courts	  refuse	  to	  require	  the	  United	  States	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
litigation	  as	  an	  involuntary	  plaintiff.	  Nutrition	  21	  v.	  The	  United	  States,	  930	  F.2d	  862,	  867	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  
1991).	  This	  article	  addresses	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  is	  not	  a	  patent	  owner	  but	  con-­‐
templates	  either	  bringing	  an	   infringement	  action	  as	  a	   co-­‐plaintiff	  with	   the	  owner	  or	   “all	   rights”	  
licensee	  or	   joining	  an	  existing	   suit	   as	   an	   intervenor-­‐plaintiff.	   Encompassed	  within	   its	   scope	  are	  
infringements	  of	  patents	  resulting	  from	  federally	  funded	  research	  that,	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Bayh-­‐Dole	  
Act,	   are	   issued	   to	   nonprofit	   institutions,	   universities,	   and	   small	   businesses	   when	   the	   non-­‐
governmental	   entity	   has	   elected	   to	   retain	   title	   and	   otherwise	   complied	  with	   the	   Act’s	   require-­‐
ments.	  This	  article	  does	  not,	  however,	  submit	  that	  federal	  research	  funding	  should	  be	  the	  sole,	  or	  
even	  the	  predominant,	   factor	  that	  the	  Justice	  Department	  should	  consider	  in	  making	  discretion-­‐
ary	  determinations	  regarding	  participation	  in	  infringement	  litigation.	  See	  infra	  note	  14.	  	  
	   10.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	   P.J.	   Federico,	  Commentary	  on	   the	  New	  Patent	  Act,	   75	   J.	  PAT.	  &	  TRADEMARK	  OFF.	  
SOC’Y	  161,	  215	  (1993)	  (only	  change	  in	  1952	  Act	  was	  to	  update	  language	  to	  refer	  to	  “civil	  action”	  
rather	  than	  “action	  on	  the	  case”	  and	  to	  note	  that	  the	  change	  did	  not	  affect	  right	  to	  jury	  trial).	  The	  
legislative	  history	  discussed	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corp.,	  717	  F.2d	  775,	  776	  (3d	  Cir.	  1983),	  see	  
infra	  note	  85,	  is	  not	  applicable	  to	  this	  issue,	  and	  nothing	  in	  the	  history	  of	  any	  of	  the	  patent	  statutes	  
addresses	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  private	  patent	  enforcement	  actions.	  
	   11.	   	  The	  DOJ	  Task	  Force	  on	  Intellectual	  Property,	  during	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  Administration,	  
made	  no	  reference	  to	  such	  suits	  in	  a	  2006	  “Progress	  Report”,	  which	  was	  apparently	  the	  last	  of	  its	  
kind.	   See	   USDOJ,	   PROGRESS	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   DEPARTMENT	   OF	   JUSTICE’S	   TASK	   FORCE	   ON	   INTELLECTUAL	  
PROPERTY	   	   (2006),	   available	   at	  
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2006/06/22/ipreport61906.pdf.	  
	   12.	   	  This	  article	   is	  agnostic	  about	  the	  value	  of	  patents	   in	   fostering	   innovation.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Tim	  
Wu,	   Intellectual	   Property,	   Innovation,	   and	   Decentralized	   Decisions,	   92	   VA.	   L.	   REV.	   123,	   127–31	  
(2006)	   (questioning	  assumption).	  Most	  commentators	  agree	   that	  actions	   for	   infringement	  or	   to	  
address	  the	  validity	  of	  issued	  patents	  are	  important	  components	  of	  a	  desirable	  system.	  See	  gener-­‐
ally	  Michael	  J.	  Burstein,	  Rules	  for	  Patents,	  52	  WM.	  &	  MARY	  L.	  REV.	  1747,	  1747	  (2011)	  (noting	  that	  
most	  suggestions	  for	  policy	  reform	  assume	  “that	  patent	  policy	  is	  best	  made	  through	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  
adjudication	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  individual	  patents.”).	  	  	  
	   13.	   	  The	  PTO	  does	  not	  have	  independent	  litigating	  authority.	  Accordingly,	  lawsuits	  would	  be	  
brought	  by	  the	  Justice	  Department,	  most	  likely	  by	  the	  Civil	  Division.	  See	  notes	  7,	  supra,	  and	  114,	  
infra.	  As	  to	  why	  “[c]entralized	  control	  of	  litigation	  in	  the	  DOJ	  creates	  political	  accountability”	  and	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should	   contemplate	   seeking	   to	   protect	   in	   infringement	   litigation.14	   It	  
does,	   however,	   operate	   from	   the	   presumption	   that	   there	   is	   a	   sound	  
argument	  that	  the	  government	  has	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  strength	  and	  durabil-­‐
ity	  of	  certain	  patents,	   including	  as	  an	  example	  “green	  technology”	  pa-­‐
tents	  that	  result	  from	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Innovation	  Strat-­‐
Strategy.15	   While	   administration	   and	   congressional	   priorities	   can	  
change,	  a	  government	  that	  encouraged	  expedited	  processing	  of	  patent	  
applications	   for	   green	   technologies16	   and	   which	   otherwise	   acknowl-­‐
edged	  through	  subsidies	  and	  tax	  credits	  the	  value	  of	  supporting	  start-­‐
ups	   in	   internationally	   competitive	   clean	   energy	   sectors17	   should	   like-­‐
wise	   consider	   supporting	   a	   patentee	   in	   an	   infringement	   case.18	   And	  
participation	  as	  a	  co-­‐plaintiff	   is,	  quite	  clearly,	  preferable	   to	  amicus	  or	  
even	  so-­‐called	  “litigating	  amicus”	  status.19	  
	  
concerns	  about	  over	  enforcement	  are	  overstated,	  see	  Seth	  Davis,	  Implied	  Public	  Rights	  of	  Action,	  
114	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  55	  (2014).	  	  
	   14.	   	  The	  case	  of	  a	  start-­‐up	  green	  technology	  patentee,	  infra,	  is	  offered	  is	  an	  example,	  not	  as	  a	  
limitation.	   It	   does	   suggest	   that	   there	   are	   instances,	   assumedly	   limited	   in	   number,	   in	  which	   the	  
United	  States	  might	  consider	  active	  participation	   in	   infringement	   litigation,	  but	   this	  article	  pur-­‐
posefully	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  identify	  categorically	  when	  the	  government	  should	  (or	  ought	  not)	  
do	  so.	  The	  example	  concerns	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  government	  has	  taken	  such	  an	  active	  role	  in	  
promoting	   patent	   applications	   that	   it	   arguably	   also	   has	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	  
issued	  patent.	   Importantly,	   these	  are	  not	   the	  only	  kinds	  of	  patents	   that	   the	  United	  States	  might	  
decide	  that	  it	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  enforcing,	  and	  it	  may	  properly	  determine	  in	  its	  discretion	  not	  to	  
attempt	  to	  enforce	  certain	  private	  patents	  even	  if	  they	  result	  from	  federal	  funding	  or	  an	  expedited	  
issuance	  process.	  	  	  
	   15.	   	  Nat’l	   Econ.	   Council,	   A	   Strategy	   for	   American	   Innovation:	   Driving	   Towards	   Sustainable	  
Growth	   and	   Quality	   Jobs	   (2009),	   available	   at	  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmericanInnovation/.	  	  
	   16.	   	  See	  Patrick	  Gattari,	  The	  Role	  of	  Patent	  Law	   in	   Incentivizing	  Green	  Technology,	  11	  NW.	   J.	  
TECH.	  &	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  41,	  42	  (2013)	  (describing	  PTO	  fast-­‐track	  program,	  which	  is	  no	  longer	  accept-­‐
ing	  new	  	  applications	  but	  continues	  to	  examine	  previously	  filed	  submissions	  out	  of	  order).	  	  
	   17.	   	  See	   generally	   Eric	   L.	   Lane,	   Building	   the	   Global	   Green	   Patent	   Highway:	   A	   Proposal	   for	  
International	   Harmonization	   of	   Green	   Technology	   Fast	   Track	   Programs,	   27	   BERKELEY	   TECH.	   L.J.	  
1119,	  1136-­‐45	  (2012)	  (describing	  processes	  in	  numerous	  countries,	  including	  the	  United	  States,	  
to	  promote	  green	  technologies	  through	  patents).	  	  
	   18.	   	  The	  high	  cost	  of	  patent	  litigation,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Jon	  E.	  Wright,	  Willful	  Patent	  Infringement	  and	  
Enhanced	  Damages—Evolution	   and	  Analysis,	   10	  GEO.	  MASON	  L.	  REV.	   97,	   97	   (2001)	   (“enormously	  
expensive	   and	   often	   swamp	  balance	   sheets”),	   suggests	   that	  many	   green	   technology	   companies,	  
which	  are	  often	  start-­‐ups	  with	  “negative	  cash	  flow,”	  Gattari,	  supra	  note	  16	  at	  43,	  may	  hesitate	  to	  
defend	  their	  patents,	  or	  seek	  settlements	  that	  devalue	  their	  worth.	  Yet	  “[f]or	  small	  firms.	  .	  .	  patent	  
rights	  might	  be	  the	  only	  effective	  means	  to	  obtain	  a	  return	  on	  investments	  in	  research	  and	  devel-­‐
opment.”	   John	  M.	  Golden,	  Principles	   for	  Patent	  Remedies,	  88	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  505,	  545	   (2010).	  When	  
patent	   infringement	   is	  unaddressed,	  holders	  may	  have	  more	  difficulty	  obtaining	  private	   invest-­‐
ment.	  See,	  e.g.,	   Clarisa	  Long,	  Patent	  Signals,	   69	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  625,	  653	   (2002)	   (“Among	  venture	  
capitalists,	   both	   the	   quantity	   and	   quality	   of	   patents	   have	   long	   been	   factors	   that	   are	   taken	   into	  
consideration	  when	  deciding	  whether	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  company,	  particularly	  in	  its	  early	  stages.”).	  	  
	   19.	   	  As	  Jeremy	  Bock	  has	  recognized,	  litigating	  amicus	  status	  has	  rarely	  been	  sought	  and	  has	  
significant	  limitations.	  Jeremy	  W.	  Bock,	  Neutral	  Litigants	  in	  Patent	  Cases,	  15	  N.C.	  J.	  L.	  &	  TECH.	  233,	  
285	   (2014)	   (“Unlike	   an	   intervenor,	   however,	   a	   litigating	   amicus	   is	   unable	   to	   appeal	   from	   any	  
judgments,	   and	  may	  be	  dismissed	  at	   any	   time	   if	   the	   court	  decides	   that	   the	   amicus	   is	  no	   longer	  
necessary.	  As	  with	  a	  regular	  amicus,	  the	  decision	  to	  allow	  litigating	  amicus	  participation	  is	  com-­‐
mitted	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  district	  court.”).	  It	  has	  traditionally	  been	  utilized	  only	  in	  civil	  rights	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This	  article	   focuses	  hereafter	  on	  how	  the	  United	  States	  might	  ar-­‐
gue	  that	  it	  has	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  in	  a	  private	  patent	  infringement	  case.	  
Part	  I	  describes	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  current	   intolerance	  of	  rights	   im-­‐
plied	   from	   statutes	   in	   cases	  brought	  by	  private	   litigants.	   It	   illustrates	  
why	  the	  government	  must	  rely	  on	  a	  different	  theory	  in	  order	  to	  poten-­‐
tially	   succeed	   in	   a	   private	   patent	   case.	   Because	   the	  United	   States	   has	  
frequently	   argued	   that	   a	   unique	   standard	   for	   implying	   a	   right	   to	   sue	  
from	   a	   statute	   should	   apply	   when	   the	   government	   is	   a	   plaintiff,	   the	  
Part	   focuses	  on	   the	  most-­‐referenced	  decision,	  Wyandotte	  Transporta-­‐
tion	  Company	  v.	  United	  States.20	  It	  concludes	  that	  Wyandotte	  is	  a	  fragile	  
cornerstone	  for	  actions	  beyond	  suits	  to	  recover	  pecuniary	  loss	  or	  rem-­‐
edy	  damage	  to	  government	  property.	  Part	  II	  discusses	  a	  little-­‐invoked	  
but	  broad	  authority	  that	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  implication	  from	  a	  statute	  
but	  rather	  rests	  on	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  effectuation	  of	   important	   fed-­‐
eral	  interests.	  It	  suggests	  that	  this	  power,	  which	  has	  been	  referenced	  in	  
several	   Supreme	   Court	   decisions	   and	   argued	   in	   several	   contexts,	  
should	  be	   examined	  as	   a	  basis	   for	   claims	   to	   enforce	   a	  private	  patent.	  
The	   last	   Part	   identifies	   several	   jurisdictional	   and	   case	   management	  
issues	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  arise	  if	  the	  United	  States	  seeks	  to	  file	  an	  action	  
or	  becomes	  a	  co-­‐plaintiff	  or	  intervenor	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  right.	  
I.	  IS	  THERE	  A	  DISTINCT	  PUBLIC	  RIGHT	  OF	  ACTION	  DOCTRINE?	  IF	  SO,	  DOES	  
IT	  SUPPORT	  AN	  IMPLIED	  RIGHT	  CLAIM	  TO	  ENFORCE	  A	  PATENT?	  
A.	  Alexander	  v.	  Sandoval	  and	  its	  Effect	  on	  Private	  Implied	  Right	  
Claims	  
In	  Alexander	  v.	  Sandoval,21	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  in	  a	  case	  involving	  
Title	  VI	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  rejected	  the	  Cort	  v.	  Ash22	  factors	  
	  
cases.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Hoptowit	  v.	  Ray,	  682	  F.2d	  1237,	  1260	  (9th	  Cir.	  1982)	  (prisoners	  rights).	  In	  gingerly	  
introducing	  district	  courts	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  party	  in	  private	  patent	  cases,	  
the	  Civil	  Division	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  seek	  only	  permissive	  intervention	  under	  Rule	  24(b).	  Bock	  
has	   suggested	   that	   the	  PTO	  might	  be	   able	   to	   intervene	  permissively	   for	   the	   specific	  purpose	  of	  
addressing	   a	  patent	   validity	   issue,	   or	   the	   Justice	  Department	   to	  opine	  on	   an	   antitrust	  question.	  
Bock,	   supra,	   at	   283.	   But	   the	   observation	   did	   not	   contemplate	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   implied	   or	  
inherent	   cause	  of	   action,	   and	   therefore	  must	  have	  assumed	   that	   intervention	  as	  of	   right	  by	   the	  
United	   States	   in	   a	   private	  patent	   case	  was	   impossible.	  Moreover,	   it	   animates	   a	   disadvantage	  of	  
permissive	  intervention.	  “The	  district	  court’s	  discretion	  .	  .	  .	  under	  Rule	  24(b),	  to	  grant	  or	  deny	  an	  
application	   for	   permissive	   intervention	   includes	   discretion	   to	   limit	   intervention	   to	   particular	  
issues.”	  Dep’t	  of	  Fair	  Employment	  &	  Hous.	  v.	  Lucent	  Technologies,	  Inc.,	  642	  F.3d	  728,	  741	  (9th	  Cir.	  
2011);	   Van	   Hoomissen	   v.	   Xerox	   Corp.,	   497	   F.2d	   180,	   181	   (9th	   Cir.	   1974).	   Depending	   on	   how	  
courts	   respond,	   permissive	   intervention	   may	   not	   be	   preferable	   to	   amicus,	   or	   even	   “litigating”	  
amicus,	  status.	  This	  article	  proposes	  that	  the	  Justice	  Department	  seek	  intervention	  as	  of	  right,	  or	  
alternatively,	  permissive	  intervention	  if	  intervention	  of	  right	  is	  denied.	  See	  Part	  III,	  infra.	  	  	  
	   20.	   	  Wyandotte	  Transportation	  Company	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  191,	  191	  (1967).	  	  
	   21.	   	  Alexander	  v.	  Sandoval,	  532	  U.S.	  275	  (2001).	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and	  looked	  only	  to	  whether	  Congress	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  private	  right	  
of	  action.	   Justice	  Scalia	  announced	  that	   the	  “right	  must	  come,	   if	  at	  all,	  
from	  the	  independent	  force	  of	  [the	  statute].”23	  Sandoval	  mandates	  that	  
the	  only	   tools	   to	  use	   to	  determine	   the	  answer	  are	   the	   text	  and	  struc-­‐
ture	  of	   the	   laws.	   Justice	  Scalia	  shunned	   legislative	  history,	  or	  specula-­‐
tion	  as	   to	  what	  Congress	   intended.	  The	   impact	  of	  Sandoval	   cannot	  be	  
understated.	  Only	   the	   clearest	   expression	  of	   congressional	   intent	  will	  
now	   suffice.	   Moreover,	   the	   Court	   essentially	   disregards	   inquiry	   into	  
that	   intent.	   Subsequent	   opinions	   have,	   virtually	   without	   exception,	  
rejected	   efforts	   to	   either	   acknowledge	   or	   expand	   private	   implied	  
rights.	  Courts	  have	  refused	  to	  imply	  causes	  of	  action	  under	  ostensibly	  
pro-­‐consumer	  statutes	  and	  regulations	  such	  as	  the	  Protecting	  Tenants	  
at	   Foreclosure	   Act,24	   the	   Home	   Affordable	   Mortgage	   Program,25	   the	  
Video	  Privacy	  Protection	  Act,26	   the	  Air	  Carrier	  Access	  Act,27	  and	  other	  
measures.28	  
B.	  The	  Demise	  of	  the	  Private	  Right	  of	  Action	  has	  Significant	  Implica-­‐
tions	  for	  Potential	  Claims	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Regarding	  the	  Infringe-­‐
ment	  of	  a	  Private	  Patent	  
Unless	  courts	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  the	  proposition	  that	  an	  implied	  
right	  of	   action	  claim	  by	   the	  government	   should	  be	  examined	   in	  a	  dif-­‐
ferent	  way,	  with	  a	  different	  standard	  applied,	  implied	  right	  suits	  by	  the	  
United	   States	   to	   seek	   injunctive	   relief	   or	   damages	   for	   private	   patent	  
infringement	  will	   not	   succeed.	  As	  noted,	   the	  patent	   legislation	  makes	  
no	  mention	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  an	  enforcer	  of	  private	  patents,	  but	  
rather	  specifies	  that	  the	  patent	  holder	  may	  bring	  an	  action.	  And	  there	  
is	  no	  legislative	  history	  to	  support	  the	  position	  that	  Congress	  even	  en-­‐
	  
	   22.	   	  Cort	  v.	  Ash,	  422	  U.S.	  66	  (1975).	  	  
	   23.	   	  Alexander,	   532	   U.S.	   at	   286.	   See	   also	   Id.	   at	   288–89	   (“It	   is	   immediately	   clear	   that	   the	  
‘rights-­‐creating’	   language	  so	  critical	   to	  the	  Court’s	  analysis	   in	  Cannon	  of	  §	  601	  is	  completely	  ab-­‐
sent	  from	  §	  602	  False	  Far	  from	  displaying	  congressional	  intent	  to	  create	  new	  rights,	  §	  602	  limits	  
agencies	  to	  ‘effectuating’	  rights	  already	  created	  by	  §	  601.”)	  (citations	  omitted).	  
	   24.	   	  Mik	  v.	  Federal	  Home	  Loan	  Mortgage	  Corporation,	  743	  F.3d	  149,	  166	  (6th	  Cir.	  2014).	  
	   25.	   	  Miller	  v.	  Chase	  Home	  Finance,	  LLC,	  677	  F.3d	  1113,	  1116	  (11th	  Cir.	  2012);	  Wigod	  v.	  Wells	  
Fargo	  Bank,	  N.A.,	  673	  F.3d	  547,	  554	  (7th	  Cir.	  2012).	  
	   26.	   	  Sterk	  v.	  Redbox	  Automated	  Retail,	  LLC,	  672	  F.3d	  535,	  538–39	  (7th	  Cir.	  2012)	  (no	  right	  of	  
action	  for	  retention	  claims	  pursuant	  to	  Act).	  
	   27.	   	  Lopez	  v.	  Jet	  Blue	  Airways,	  662	  F.3d	  593,	  597	  (2d	  Cir.	  2011);	  Boswell	  v.	  Skywest	  Airlines,	  
Inc.,	  361	  F.3d	  1263,	  1270	  (10th	  Cir.	  2004);	  Love	  v.	  Delta	  Air	  Lines,	  310	  F.3d	  1347,	  1359	  (11th	  Cir.	  
2002).	  	  
	   28.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Stew	  Farm,	  Ltd.	  v.	  Natural	  Resources	  Conservation	  Serv.,	  767	  F.3d	  554,	  565	  (6th	  
Cir.	  2014)	  (Food	  Security	  Act);	  El	  Paso	  Natural	  Gas	  Co.	  v.	  U.S.,	  750	  F.3d	  863,	  890	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  2014)	  
(Indian	  Dump	  Cleanup	  Act);	  Clear	  Sky	  Car	  Wash	  LLC	  v.	  City	  of	  Chesapeake,	  Va.,	  743	  F.3d	  438,	  444	  
(4th	  Cir.	  2014)	  (Uniform	  Relocation	  Assistance	  and	  Real	  Property	  Acquisition	  Policies	  Act).	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visioned,	  much	   less	   endorsed,	   such	   actions.	  Whether	   such	   a	   different	  
doctrine	  exists,	  and	  how	  it	  has	  been	  and	  might	  be	  applied,	  is	  discussed	  
below.	  But	  the	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  now	  essential	  that	  public	  rights	  of	  ac-­‐
tion	  be	   viewed	  differently,	   both	   generally	   and	   for	  patent	   lawsuits.	  As	  
Seth	  Davis	  notes,	  application	  of	  a	  Sandoval	  approach	  to	  public	  litigation	  
would	  in	  most	  cases	  “bar	  a	  public	  right	  to	  sue	  even	  when	  a	  government	  
seeks	   to	   vindicate	   a	   ‘private	   right’	   against	   pecuniary	   loss.”29	   Even	   if	  
courts	  historically	  have	  been	  willing,	   at	   least	   in	   some	  cases,	   to	   give	   a	  
more	   liberal	   scope	   to	  public	   rights	  of	  action,	   the	  Court’s	  private	   right	  
retrenchment	  signals	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  endorse	  “independent	  feder-­‐
al	  court	  lawmaking.”30	  
The	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  new	  rights	  of	  action	  and	  to	  limit	  reme-­‐
dies	   are	   both	   reflective	   of	   “the	   recent	   trend	   against	   private	   enforce-­‐
ment,”31	   despite	   the	   notion	   in	   Franklin	   v.	   Gwinnett	   County	   Public	  
Schools32	  that	  the	  two	  are	  analytically	  distinct.33	  The	  United	  States	  has,	  
on	   several	   occasions,	   pointed	   to	  Wyandotte	   as	   endorsing	   a	   separate,	  
more	  liberal	  approach	  to	  public	  implied	  rights	  and	  as	  justifying	  a	  find-­‐
ing	   that	   an	   implied	   right	   exists	   in	  various	   contexts.34	  But,	   as	  we	   shall	  
see,	   the	  background	  of	   the	  decision,	   the	  Court’s	   language,	   subsequent	  
judicial	  interpretations,	  and	  limited	  application	  in	  practice	  by	  the	  gov-­‐
ernment	  demonstrate	  its	  short	  reach.	  
C.	  Wyandotte	  as	  a	  Potential	  Basis	  for	  Public	  Implied	  Right	  Claims	  
If	   any	  modern	   Supreme	  Court	   decision	   supports	   the	   proposition	  
that	   public	   implied	   rights	   of	   action	   are	   distinct	   from	   private,	  
Cort/Sandoval	  rights,	  and	  may	  potentially	  have	  broad	  applicability,	  it	  is	  
Wyandotte.	   Wyandotte	   has	   considerable	   initial	   appeal	   for	   potential	  
suits	  by	   the	  United	  States	   to	  enforce	  a	  private	  patent,	   as	   it	   stands	   for	  
the	  proposition	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  an	  implied	  right	  of	  action	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  clearly	  contrary	  congressional	  intent.35	  
	  
	   29.	   	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  33.	  
	   30.	   	  Gillian	   E.	   Metzger,	   Ordinary	   Administrative	   Law	   as	   Constitutional	   Common	   Law,	   110	  
COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  479,	  506	   (2010)	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  decline	  of	   implied	   rights	  of	   action”	   is	   symptomatic	  of	   “the	  
Court’s	  increased	  resistance	  to	  independent	  federal	  court	  lawmaking”).	  See	  also	  Arthur	  R.	  Miller,	  
From	  Conley	  to	  Twombly	  to	  Iqbal:	  A	  Double	  Play	  on	  the	  Federal	  Rules	  of	  Civil	  Procedure,	  60	  DUKE	  L.J.	  
1,	  10	  (2010).	  	  	  
	   31.	   	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  12.	  
	   32.	   	  Franklin	  v.	  Gwinnett	  County	  Public	  Schools,	  503	  U.S.	  60	  (1992).	  	  
	   33.	   	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  12	  n.49	  (“[j]udicial	  retrenchment	  from	  implied	  private	  rights	  of	  
action	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  Court’s	  apparent	  ‘hostility’	  to	  private	  enforcement.”).	  	  
	   34.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Brief	  of	  United	  States	  as	  Defendant/Appellee,	  In	  re	  American	  River	  Transporta-­‐
tion	  Company	  v.	  United	  States,	  No.	  14-­‐1867	  (8th	  Cir.	  July	  16,	  2014),	  2014	  WL	  3703299.	  
	   35.	   	  Wyandotte	  Transportation	  Company	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  191,	  200	  (1967).	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Before	  Wyandotte,	   courts	   “had	   consistently	   held	   that	   owners	   of	  
sunken	  vessels	  had	  an	  absolute	  right	  of	  abandonment,	  and	  that	  follow-­‐
ing	   abandonment,	   the	   government	  had	  no	   in	   personam	   rights	   against	  
the	   owners	   of	   the	   vessel	   to	   recover	   expenses	   incurred	   in	   raising	   a	  
sunken	   vessel	   which	   posed	   a	   threat	   to	   navigation.”36	   The	  Wreck	   Act	  
was	   enacted	   as	   part	   of	   the	  Rivers	   and	  Harbors	  Act	   (RHA)	   of	   1899.	   It	  
was	  largely	  in	  response	  to	  Willamette	  Iron	  Bridge	  Co.	  v.	  Hatch,37	  which	  
had	   held	   that	   the	   common	   law	   did	   not	   address	   the	   abandonment	   of	  
vessels	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  obstructions	  in	  navigable	  waters.38	  The	  appli-­‐
cable	  provisions	  were	  Section	  10,	  which	  prohibited	   “[t]he	   creation	  of	  
any	  obstruction	  not	  affirmatively	  authorized	  by	  Congress	   to	   the	  navi-­‐
gable	   capacity	   of	   any	   of	   the	  waters	   of	   the	   United	   States”,	   Section	   12,	  
which	  made	  a	  violation	  of	  Section	  10	  a	  criminal	  offense,	  and	  Section	  15,	  
which	  provided,	   in	  pertinent	  part,	  that	  “it	  shall	  not	  be	  lawful	  to	  tie	  up	  
or	  anchor	  vessels	  or	  other	  craft	  in	  navigable	  channels	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  
as	   to	   prevent	   or	   obstruct	   the	   passage	   of	   other	   vessels	   or	   craft;	   or	   to	  
voluntarily	  or	  carelessly	  sink,	  or	  permit	  to	  cause	  to	  be	  sunk,	  vessels	  or	  
other	   craft	   in	   navigable	   channels.”	   The	   statute	   did	   not,	   however,	   ex-­‐
pressly	  provide	   for	   the	   recovery	  by	   the	  United	   States	   of	   the	   costs	   in-­‐
curred	  in	  raising	  or	  removing	  vessels.	  
The	  Court	  had	  previously	  interpreted	  Section	  10	  in	  two	  cases,	  San-­‐
itary	  District	  of	  Chicago	  v.	  United	  States39	  and	  United	  States	  v.	  Republic	  
Steel	  Company.40	  Wyandotte	  was	  a	  logical	  extension	  of	  the	  Court’s	  deci-­‐
	  
	   36.	   	  Frederic	  E.	  Cann,	  Interaction	  of	  the	  Limitation	  of	  Liability	  Act	  and	  the	  Wreck	  Act:	  Who	  can	  
Limit	  Liability	  for	  the	  Government’s	  Wreck	  Removal	  Expenses?,	  30	  U.	  FLA.	  L.	  REV.	  560,	  560	  (1978).	  
	   37.	   	  Willamette	  Iron	  Bridge	  Co.	  v.	  Hatch,	  125	  U.S.	  1	  (1888).	  
	   38.	   	  See	  Cann,	  supra	  note	  36,	  at	  563.	  
	   39.	   	  Sanitary	  District	  of	  Chicago	  v.	  United	  States,	  266	  U.S.	  405,	  425–26	  (1925).	  
	   40.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Republic	  Steel	  Company,	  362	  U.S.	  482,	  492	  (1960).	  In	  Sanitary	  District,	  
the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  obtain	  an	  injunction	  preventing	  the	  Sanitary	  District	  
of	  Chicago	  from	  increasing	  its	  water	  intake	  from	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  by	  discharging	  sewage	  into	  the	  
Mississippi	  River	  watershed.	  Because	  the	  activity	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  statute’s	  prohibition	  
of	  modifications	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  lake,	  and	  thereby	  affected	  navigable	  waters,	  an	  injunction	  was	  
appropriate.	  The	  Court’s	  reasoning	  was,	  in	  part,	  based	  on	  the	  government’s	  obligation	  to	  comply	  
with	  a	  treaty.	  Sanitary,	  266	  U.S.	  at	  425.	  Significantly,	  the	  Court	  stressed	  that	  “[t]he	  Attorney	  Gen-­‐
eral	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  office	  may	  bring	  this	  proceeding	  and	  no	  statute	  is	  necessary	  to	  authorize	  the	  
suit.”	  Id	  at	  426.	  In	  Republic	  Steel,	  the	  Court	  addressed	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  polluter’s	  industrial	  
wastes	   discharged	   into	   the	   Calumet	   River	   had	   reduced	   the	   depth	   of	   the	   navigable	   channel.	   On	  
several	   occasions,	   the	  Army	  Corps	  of	  Engineers	  had	  dredged	   the	   channel.	   The	  Court	   concluded	  
that	  the	  government	  could	  seek	  an	  injunction	  requiring	  that	  Republic	  maintain	  the	  channel	  depth	  
to	   assure	   navigation.	   Placing	   emphasis	   on	   the	   statutory	   term	   “navigable	   capacity,”	   the	   Court	  
reasoned	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  “an	  interest	  to	  protect	  or	  defend.”	  Republic	  Steel,	  362	  U.S.	  at	  
492.	   It	   noted	   that	   “Congress	  has	   legislated	  and	  made	   its	  purpose	   clear;	   it	   has	  provided	  enough	  
federal	  law	  [through	  section	  10]	  from	  which	  appropriate	  remedies	  may	  be	  fashioned	  even	  though	  
they	  rest	  on	  inferences.”	  Id.	  The	  Court	  had	  also	  previously	  held	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  sue	  in	  
tort	  in	  the	  event	  it	  sustained	  a	  pecuniary	  loss.	  United	  States	  v.	  Standard	  Oil	  Co.,	  332	  U.S.	  301,	  315	  
n.22	  (1947)	  (“[i]t	  has	  	  not	  been	  necessary	  for	  Congress	  to	  pass	  statutes	  imposing	  civil	  liability	  in	  
2015]	   PATENT	  INFRINGEMENT	  LITIGATION	   493	  
sions	  in	  Sanitary	  District	  and	  Republic	  Steel.	  Most	  significantly	  for	  pre-­‐
sent	  purposes,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that	  “the	  general	  rule	  [is]	  that	  the	  Unit-­‐
ed	  States	  may	  sue	  to	  protect	  its	  interests.”41	  Moreover,	  the	  rule	  “is	  not	  
necessarily	   inapplicable	   when	   the	   particular	   governmental	   interest	  
sought	  to	  be	  protected	  is	  expressed	  in	  a	  statute	  carrying	  criminal	  pen-­‐
alties	  for	  its	  violation.”42	  Concluding	  that	  “[t]he	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  crim-­‐
inal	   penalties	   explicitly	   provided	   for”	   is	   “beyond	   dispute”,43	   it	   found	  
that	  prison	  terms	  are	  “hardly	  a	  satisfactory	  remedy	   for	   the	  pecuniary	  
injury	   which	   the	   negligent	   shipowner	   may	   inflict	   upon	   the	   sover-­‐
eign.”44	  Therefore,	   although	  unlike	   in	  Republic	  Steel	   the	  Court	  did	  not	  
base	  its	  opinion	  on	  Section	  10,	  it	  nonetheless	  concluded	  that	  “the	  prin-­‐
ciples	   of	   Republic	   Steel	   apply,	   by	   analogy,	   to	   the	   issues	   now	   before	  
us.”45	   It	  gave	  no	  express	   indication	   that	   it	   intended	  to	  examine	  public	  
and	  private	   rights	   of	   action	  under	   the	   same	   standard.	   Instead,	   it	   rea-­‐
soned	  that	  the	  private	  rights	  cases	  lent	  support	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  should	  have	  an	  implied	  right.46	  
The	  contemporaneous	  response	  of	  many	  lower	  courts	  was	  to	  con-­‐
flate	  public	  and	  private	  rights,	  and	   in	  some	  cases	  to	  either	  seek	  to	  di-­‐
minish	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  Borak-­‐Wyandotte	  test	  
for	  private	  rights	  or	  to	  ignore	  it	  completely.	  For	  example,	  in	  Breitweiser	  
v.	   KMS	   Industries,	   Inc.,47	   the	   court	   determined	   that	   a	   private	   right	  
should	  be	  implied	  only	  when	  the	  statute	  either	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  a	  
remedy	  at	  all	  or	   the	  remedy	   is	  “grossly	   inadequate.”48	  Conflation	  con-­‐
tinued	  in	  subsequent	  decisions	  such	  as	  United	  States	  v.	  St.	  Bernard	  Par-­‐
	  
those	  situations	  where	  it	  has	  been	  understood	  since	  the	  day	  of	  the	  common	  law	  that	  the	  sover-­‐
eign	  is	  protected	  from	  tortious	  interference.”).	  	  	  
	   41.	   	  Wyandotte	  Transportation	  Company	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  191,	  201	  (1967).	  	  	  
	   42.	   	  Id.	  at	  201–02.	  	  
	   43.	   	  Id.	  at	  202.	  
	   44.	   	  Id.	  
	   45.	   	  Id.	  at	  203.	  	  
	   46.	   	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Court	   did	   not	   expressly	   say	   that	   the	   standards	   are	   different.	  
There	  is	  a	  cogent	  argument	  that	  the	  only	  thing	  the	  Court	  was	  doing	  was	  to	  accept	  and	  incorporate	  
the	  previously	  decided	  private	  right	  cases	  and	  thereby	  apply	  what	  was	  then	  a	  relatively	   lenient	  
approach,	  under	  J.I.	  Case	  Co.	  v.	  Borak,	  377	  U.S.	  426,	  426	  (1964),	  to	  both	  implied	  causes	  of	  action	  
and	  remedies.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  significant	  that	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  describe	  Sanitary	  District	  or	  Republic	  
Steel	   as	   establishing	   a	   standard	   unique	   to	   claims	   by	   the	   United	   States.	   Indeed,	   the	   opinion	  
stressed	  the	  need	  for	  treating	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  private	  party.	  If	  the	  Court	  
meant	  to	  incorporate	  and	  apply	  the	  private	  right	  standard,	  the	  present-­‐day	  reach	  of	  Wyandotte	  is	  
limited	  indeed.	  Because	  of	  the	  change	  in	  approach	  to	  private	  cases,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  Wyandotte	  
is	  not	  only	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  Court’s	  current	  approach	  to	  implied	  rights,	  its	  liberal	  view	  as	  to	  
implied	  remedies	  generally	  must	  now	  be	  rejected	  as	  well.	  	  	  
	   47.	   	  Breitweiser	   v.	   KMS	   Industries,	   Inc.,	   467	   F.2d	   1391	   (5th	   Cir.	   1972),	   cert.	   denied,	   Breit-­‐
weiser	  v.	  KMS	  Industries,	  Inc.,	  410	  U.S.	  969	  (1973).	  
	   48.	   	  Id.	  at	  1392–93.	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ish49	  and	  United	  States	  v.	  Gilbert.50	  A	  number	  of	  courts,	  while	  acknowl-­‐
edging	  Wyandotte,	  concluded	  that	  ordinary	  rules	  of	  statutory	  construc-­‐
tion	   should	   nonetheless	   limit	   or	   deny	   implied	   remedies.51	   And,	   not	  
surprisingly,	  courts,	  again	  referencing	  Wyandotte	  as	  part	  of	  the	  private	  
implied	  right	  canon,	  denied	  implied	  right	  claims	  by	  emphasizing	  legis-­‐
lative	  intent.52	  Still	  others,	  also	  citing	  Wyandotte,	  denied	  implied	  right	  
claims	  when	  the	  statute	  in	  question	  set	  forth	  an	  alternative	  remedy.53	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	   itself	  has	   subsequently	   cited	  Wyandotte	   only	  
once,	  in	  Cannon	  v.	  University	  of	  Chicago.54	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  Wyandotte	  
has	  been	  specifically	  cited	  by	  lower	  courts	  as	  affirming	  or	  supporting	  a	  
right	   of	   action	  by	   the	  United	   States,	   it	   has	   almost	   always	   been	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  a	  restitution	  remedy	  or	  to	  protect	  the	  government’s	  posses-­‐
	  
	   49.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  St.	  Bernard	  Parish,	  756	  F.2d	  1116,	  1122–23	  (5th	  Cir.	  1985)	  (using	  pri-­‐
vate	   right	  of	  action	  doctrine	   in	  examining	  whether	  United	  States	  had	  action	  under	   the	  National	  
Flood	  Insurance	  Act	  to	  seek	  recovery	  for	  flood	  cleanup	  costs).	  
	   50.	   	  United	   States	   v.	   Gilbert,	   244	   F.3d	   888,	   913	   (11th	   Cir.	   2001)	   (examining	   whether	   the	  
United	  States	  had	  an	  implied	  private	  right	  of	  action	  to	  seek	  an	  order	  requiring	  a	  defendant	  to	  file	  a	  
third-­‐party	  forfeiture	  claim	  in	  a	  RICO	  case).	  
	   51.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Hollaway	  v.	  Bristol-­‐Meyers-­‐Corp.,	  485	  F.2d	  986,	  988-­‐89,	  1002	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1973);	  
Chaves	   v.	   Freshplet	   Food,	   Inc.,	   456	   F.2d	   890,	   893-­‐95	   (10th	   Cir.),	   cert.	   denied,	   409	   U.S.	   1042	  
(1972);	  Western	   Colo.	   Fruit	   Growers	   Ass’n	   v.	   Marshall,	   473	   F.	   Supp.	   693,	   697	   (D.	   Colo.	   1979)	  
(denying	  implied	  counterclaim	  for	  damages	  to	  recover	  costs	  incurred	  in	  the	  transport	  and	  hous-­‐
ing	  of	  seasonal	  laborers).	  
	   52.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Acevedo	   v.	  Nassau	  County,	   500	   F.2d	   1078,	   1083-­‐84	   (2d	   Cir.	   1974);	   Jordan	   v.	  
Montgomery	  Ward	  &	  Co.,	  442	  F.2d	  78,	  81	  (8th	  Cir.	  1971).	  
	   53.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Rogers	  v.	  Ray	  Gardner	  Flying	  Serv.,	  Inc.	  435	  F.2d	  1389,	  1393	  (5th	  Cir.	  1970).	  	  	  
	   54.	   	  Cannon	  v.	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  441	  U.S.	  677	  (1979).	  The	  majority	  opinion,	  in	  applying	  
the	  Cort	   test,	   referenced	  Wyandotte	   and	  Republic	   Steel	   and	  noted	   that	   “[a]nalogously,	   the	  Court	  
has	  implied	  causes	  of	  action	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  United	  States	  where	  the	  statute	  creates	  a	  duty	  in	  favor	  
the	  public	  at	  large.”	  Id.	  at	  693.	  The	  language	  suggests	  that	  private	  implied	  rights	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  
a	  different	  standard,	  but	  does	  not	  describe	  the	  breadth	  of	  a	  public	  implied	  right	  doctrine	  or	  even	  
hint	   that	  Wyandotte	  has	  application	  beyond	  its	  recovery	  of	  costs	  context.	  A	  more	  extensive	  dis-­‐
cussion	  occurred	   in	   Justice	  Powell’s	   dissent,	  which	   ironically	  was	   the	  pivot	   toward	  a	  highly	   re-­‐
strictive	  view	  of	  implied	  rights,	  in	  which	  he	  declared	  his	  view	  that	  “[w]hen	  Congress	  chooses	  not	  
to	  provide	  a	  private	  civil	  remedy,	  federal	  courts	  should	  not	  assume	  the	  legislative	  role	  of	  creating	  
such	  a	  remedy	  and	  thereby	  enlarge	   their	   jurisdiction.”	   Id.	  at	  730-­‐31	  (Powell,	   J.,	  dissenting).	  The	  
United	  States	  has,	  particularly	   in	   the	  RHA	  cost	   recovery	  context,	   referenced	   the	  dissent	  as	   sup-­‐
porting	  its	  argument	  that	  public	  implied	  rights	  of	  action	  should	  be	  viewed	  differently.	  See	  Brief	  of	  
United	  States	  as	  Defendant/Appellee,	   In	  re	  American	  River	  Transp.	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States,	  No.	  14-­‐
1867	   (8th	   Cir.	   July	   16,	   2014),	   2104	  WL	   3703299.	   The	   language	   relied	   upon	   is	   Justice	   Powell’s	  
statement	   that	   “the	   implication	   of	   civil	   remedies	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   Government,	   see	   Wyandotte	  
Transp.	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States,	  [];	  United	  States	  v.	  Republic	  Steel	  Corp.,	  []	  [is]	  significantly	  different	  
from	   the	   implication	   of	   a	   private	   remedy	   from	   a	   federal	   statute.”	   Cannon,	   441	   U.S.	   at	   743	   n.3	  
(Powell,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  But	  that	  language,	  which	  appears	  in	  a	  footnote,	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  sentence	  
that	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  reference	  is	  to	  the	  extrapolation	  of	  a	  civil	  penalty	  from	  a	  criminal	  stat-­‐
ute,	  rather	  than	  endorsement	  of	  a	  broad	  public	  right	  of	  action.	   In	  Wyandotte	  and	  Republic	  Steel,	  
the	  Court	  was	  willing	  to	  find	  a	  right	  of	  action	  to	  seek	  a	  civil	  penalty	  under	  a	  statute	  that	  references	  
criminal	  enforcement.	  Id.	  Thus,	  the	  “significant”	  difference	  referenced	  by	  Powell	  most	  likely	  was	  
to	  civil	  penalties	   in	  a	  specific	  and	  narrow	  context.	   It	   is,	   indeed,	  significant	  that	  no	  court	  or	  com-­‐
mentator	  has	  specifically	  referenced	  the	  Powell	  dissent	  in	  support	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  Wyan-­‐
dotte	  created	  or	  applied	  a	  broad	  public	  implied	  right.	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sory	  interest	  in	  natural	  resources.55	  	  Another	  way	  in	  which	  Wyandotte	  
is	   narrowly	   cited	   is	   for	   the	   proposition	   that	   an	   injunction	   may	   be	  
sought	   in	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   statute	   in	   question	   addresses	   criminal	  
violations.56	  On	  several	  occasions,	   courts	  have	  agreed	   that	   the	  United	  
States	  may	  in	  an	  implied	  action	  seek	  recovery	  of	  costs	  or	  an	  injunction	  
or	  damages	  to	  protect	  the	  government’s	  proprietary	  interest	  but	  have	  
neither	   cited	   nor	   relied	   upon	  Wyandotte.57	   Moreover,	   in	   some	   cases,	  
courts	   have	   recognized,	   in	   cases	   involving	   unregistered	   agricultural	  
products	   and	   illegal	   food	   stamp	   distribution,	   federal	   implied	   rights	  
without	  reference	  to	  either	  Wyandotte	  or	  the	  private	  implied	  right	  cas-­‐
es.58	  In	  others,	  however,	  courts	  have	  refused	  to	  imply	  a	  federal	  right	  of	  
action	   even	   for	   recovery	   of	   costs,	   either	   by	   applying	   private	   remedy	  
case	  law	  or	  by	  finding	  that	  the	  statute	  did	  not	  provide	  for	  the	  remedy	  
sought.59	  
	  
	   55.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  Fifth	  Circuit,	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Ray,	  423	  F.2d	  16,	  21–22	  (5th	  Cir.	  1970),	  
soon	  after	  Wyandotte	  endorsed	  a	  right	  of	  action	  to	  enjoin	  construction	  that	  would	  affect	  a	  coral	  
reef.	  The	  court	  reasoned	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  an	  “overwhelming.	  .	  .vital	  interest”	  in	  ensuring	  
that	  the	  coral	  remained	  healthy	  and	  that	  “protective	  action	  by	  the	  Government	  to	  protect	  despoli-­‐
ation	  of	  these	  unique	  natural	  resources	  is	  of	  tantamount	  importance.”	  Id.	  at	  22–23.	  See	  also	  Uni-­‐
versity	  of	  Texas	  Medical	  Branch	  at	  Galveston	  v.	  United	  States,	  557	  F.2d	  438,	  451	  (5th	  Cir.	  1977)	  
(recovery	   of	   cost	   of	   removing	   sunken	   barge).	   An	   in	   personam	   remedy	   to	   recover	   the	   costs	   of	  
repairing	  a	  river	   lock	   that	  was	  damaged	  by	  a	  barge	  was	  approved	  by	   the	  Sixth	  Circuit	   in	  Hines,	  
Inc.	  v.	  United	  States.	  551	  F.2d	  717,	  727	  (6th	  Cir.	  1977).	  The	  Ninth	  Circuit	  likewise	  cited	  Wyandotte	  
in	  upholding	  a	  claim	  by	  the	  United	  States	  for	  recovery	  of	  costs	  expended	  in	  removing	  piers	  pursu-­‐
ant	  to	  Section	  10	  of	  the	  RHA.	  United	  States	  v.	  Alameda	  Gateway	  Ltd.,	  213	  F.3d	  1161,	  1166	  (9th	  Cir.	  
2000).	  
	   56.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Seminole	  Tribe,	  45	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1330,	  1331	  (M.D.	  Fla.	  1999).	  	  	  
	   57.	   	  The	  Sixth	  Circuit,	  without	  reference	  to	  Wyandotte,	  held	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could,	   in	  
furtherance	   of	   the	   Spending	   Clause	   and	   the	   government’s	   interest	   in	   ensuring	   that	   conditions	  
imposed	  on	  the	  recipients	  of	  federal	  funds	  are	  properly	  enforced,	  bring	  an	  action	  to	  enforce	  the	  
Family	  Education	  Rights	  and	  Privacy	  Act.	  United	  States	  v.	  Miami	  Univ.,	  294	  F.3d	  797,	  808	  (6th	  Cir.	  
2002).	   The	   Eleventh	   Circuit	   approved	   of	   “injunctive	   relief,	   declaratory	   judgment	   and	   money	  
damages”	  associated	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  sunken	  barge.	  United	  States	  v.	  Baycon	  Indus.,	  Inc.,	  804	  
F.2d	  630,	  633	  (11th	  Cir.	  1986).	  It	  subsequently	  approved	  of	  a	  mandatory	  injunction	  to	  require	  a	  
Florida	  state	  agency	  to	  comply	  with	  state	  statutory	  duties	   in	  order	   to	  protect	   the	  United	  States’	  
proprietary	   interests	   in	   the	   Everglades	   National	   Park	   and	   in	   a	   national	   wildlife	   refuge.	   United	  
States	  v.	  South	  Florida	  Water	  Mgmt.	  Dist.,	  28	  F.3d	  1563,	  1571	  (11th	  Cir.	  1994),	  cert.	  denied,	  514	  
U.S.	   1107	   (1995).	   Similarly,	   the	   First	   Circuit	   approved,	   again	   without	   citing	  Wyandotte,	   of	   an	  
implied	  right	  of	  action	   to	   recover	   improper	  Medicare	  payments,	  noting	   that	   “[i]n	   the	  context	  of	  
recovery	   of	   overpayments,	   the	   government	   has	   broad	   power	   to	   recover	   monies	   wrongly	   paid	  
from	  the	  Treasury,	  even	  absent	  any	  express	  statutory	  authorization	  to	  sue.”	  United	  States	  v.	  Lahey	  
Clinic	   Hosp.,	   399	   F.3d	   1,	   15	   (1st	   Cir.	   2005)	   (citing	   United	   States	   v.	   Wurts,	   303	   U.S.	   414,	   415	  
(1938)).	  	  	  
	   58.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Rx	  Depot,	  Inc.,	  438	  F.3d	  1052,	  1057	  (10th	  Cir.	  2006)	  (disgorge-­‐
ment	  remedy	  sought	  against	  Canadian	  exporter	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  to	  the	  United	  States);	  Woods	  
v.	  United	  States,	  724	  F.2d	  1444,	  1448	  (9th	  Cir.	  1984)	  (suit	  for	  reimbursement	  of	  food	  stamp	  funds	  
allegedly	   improperly	   paid);	   Impro	   Products,	   Inc.	   v.	   Block,	   722	   F.2d	   845,	   852	   (D.C.	   Cir.	   1983)	  
(agricultural	  products).	  
	   59.	   	  The	  Fifth	  Circuit,	  for	  example,	  rejected	  an	  implied	  strict	  liability	  claim	  under	  the	  Refuse	  
Act	  because	  while	  the	  act	  included	  a	  strict	  liability	  provision,	  it	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  costs	  at	  issue.	  
United	  States	  v.	  Dixie	  Carriers,	  Inc.,	  627	  F.2d	  736,	  741	  (5th	  Cir.	  1980).	  It	  declined,	  in	  contrast	  with	  
the	  Sixth	  Circuit	  in	  Hines	  in	  a	  virtually	  identical	  factual	  context,	  to	  endorse	  an	  implied	  in	  personam	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Similarly,	  Wyandotte,	  for	  a	  decision	  with	  potentially	  broad	  ramifi-­‐
cations,	  has	  engendered	  little	  academic	  curiosity,	  and	  what	  exists	  hard-­‐
ly	   supports	   a	   robust	   interpretation.	   The	   more	   recent,	   and	   sparse,	  
commentary	  has	  concerned	  the	  relatively	  mundane	  question	  whether	  
the	  Court’s	  rationale	  in	  construing	  the	  Wreck	  Act,	  which	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  
RHA	   “concern[s]	   wreck	   removal	   responsibilities	   and	   expressly	   con-­‐
template[s]	  an	  in	  personam	  remedy”60	  extends	  to	  in	  rem	  remedies	  or	  to	  
in	  personam	   remedies	   in	  other	  reimbursement	  contexts.61	  Other	  anal-­‐
yses	   treat	  Wyandotte	   as	   simply	  another	  private	   right	  of	   action	  case,62	  
effectively	  cabin	  the	  decision	  solely	  to	  the	  RHA,63	  assume	  without	  dis-­‐
cussion	  that	  it	  more	  particularly	  applies	  exclusively	  to	  the	  Wreck	  Act,64	  
or,	   infrequently	  and	  most	   liberally,	  conclude	  that	   it	  simply	  effectuates	  
the	  government’s	  “recovery	  of	  public	  service	  expenditures.”65	  
The	  absence	  of	  academic	  curiosity	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  given	  
that	   the	  United	  States	  has	   rarely	  advocated	  use	  of	  Wyandotte	   in	  non-­‐
cost	  recovery	  cases,	  despite	  its	  view	  that	  the	  decision	  has	  considerable	  
scope.66	   And	   when	   the	   United	   States	   has	   sought	   to	   apply	  Wyandotte	  
	  
remedy	  against	  a	  barge	  owner,	  citing	  private	  rights	  cases	   for	   the	  proposition	   that	   “a	  number	  of	  
recent	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions	  [have	  held]	  that	  we	  should	  be	  reluctant	  to	  imply	  a	  remedy	  broad-­‐
er	  than	  Congress	  expressly	  provided.”	   In	  re	  Barnacle	  Marine	  Mgmt.,	  233	  F.3d	  865,	  870	  (5th	  Cir.	  
2000).	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  The	  Tug	  Sundial,	  861	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1208,	  1217	  (D.	  Or.	  2012)	  (the	  
most	  notable	  of	  several	  district	  court	  opinions	  that	  endorse	  Barnacle).	  And	  it	  refused	  to	  apply,	  or	  
even	  mention,	  Wyandotte	   in	   the	   seemingly	   clear-­‐cut	   context	   of	   recovery	   of	   flood	   cleanup	   costs	  
under	  the	  National	  Flood	  Insurance	  Act.	  United	  States	  v.	  St.	  Bernard	  Parish,	  756	  F.2d	  1116,	  1122-­‐
23	  (5th	  Cir.	  1985)	  (describing	  the	  United	  States	  as	  seeking	  an	  implied	  private	  right	  of	  action,	  and	  
applying	  private	   right	   cases).	  The	  Third,	  Fourth,	  and	  Ninth	  Circuits,	   in	   significant	  decisions	  dis-­‐
cussed	   hereinbelow,	   United	   States	   v.	   Solomon,	   563	   F.2d	   1121	   (4th	   Cir.	   1977);	   United	   States	   v.	  
Mattson,	  600	  F.2d	  1295	  (9th	  Cir.	  1979);	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corp.,	  717	  F.2d	  775	  (3d	  Cir.	  1983);	  
United	   States	   v.	   City	   of	   Philadelphia,	   644	   F.2d	   187	   (3d	   Cir.	   1981),	   specifically	   refused	   to	   apply	  
Wyandotte	  in	  civil	  rights	  and	  patent	  cases.	  
	   60.	   	  David	  W.	  Robertson	  &	  Michael	  F.	  Sturley,	  Recent	  Development,	  Recent	  Developments	   in	  
Admiralty	  and	  Maritime	  Law	  at	   the	  National	  Level	  and	   in	   the	  Fifth	  and	  Eleventh	  Circuits,	  26	  TUL.	  
MAR.	  L.J.	  193,	  285	  (2001).	  	  
	   61.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Lee	  A.	  Handford,	  Comment,	  Serious	  Snag	  in	  the	  Wreck	  Act:	  Non-­‐Negligent	  Own-­‐
ers’	  Liability	  for	  Removal	  of	  a	  Wreck,	  15	  TUL.	  MAR.	  L.J.	  103,	  114	  (1990).	  
	   62.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  William	  L.	  Larson,	  Note,	  Effective	  Enforcement	  of	   the	  Foreign	  Corrupt	  Practices	  
Act,	   32	   STAN.	   L.	   REV.	   561,	   571	   (1980)	   (Wyandotte	   created	   a	   three-­‐part	   test	   for	   private	   implied	  
rights	  of	  action	  after	  Borak	  and	  preceding	  Cort).	  
	   63.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Donald	  C.	  Greenman,	  Limitation	  of	  Liability	  Unlimited,	  32	  J.	  MAR.	  L.	  &	  COM.	  279,	  
295	  (2001);	   James	  Stephen	  O’Brien,	   Jr.,	  Note,	  Admiralty—Deviation	   in	   the	  Fifth	  Circuit:	  The	  New	  
Interpretation	  of	  the	  Wreck	  Act,	  59	  TUL.	  L.	  REV.	  1089,	  1093	  (1985).	  
	   64.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  R.	  Michael	  Underhill,	  The	  Sovereign	  as	  Plaintiff:	  Clean	  Seas	  and	  the	  Other	  Coin	  of	  
the	  Realm,	  3	  U.S.F.	  MAR.	  L.J.	  37,	  40	  (1990/1991).	  
	   65.	   	  See	  Joel	  M.	  Gora,	  The	  Pentagon	  Papers	  Case	  and	  the	  Path	  Not	  Taken:	  A	  Personal	  Memoir	  
on	   the	   First	   Amendment	   and	   the	   Separation	   of	   Powers,	   19	   CARDOZO	   L.	   REV.	   1311,	   1311	   (1998)	  
(Wyandotte	  has	  no	  application	  in	  cases	  involving	  First	  Amendment	  rights).	  	  
	   66.	   	  Indeed,	  the	  Solicitor	  General,	  in	  opposing	  certiorari	  in	  2009	  in	  a	  Fifth	  Circuit	  case	  involv-­‐
ing	  a	  drydock	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Hurricane	  Katrina,	  broke	  away	  from	  its	  moorings	  and	  sank	  in	  the	  
Industrial	  Canal	   in	  New	  Orleans,	  argued	  that	  Wyandotte	  has	   little	  or	  no	  modern-­‐day	  application	  
even	   in	   cases	   involving	   non-­‐negligent	   sinkings,	   because	   of	   subsequent	   1986	   revisions	   to	   the	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more	  expansively,	  including	  in	  a	  patent	  case,	  it	  has	  met	  with	  consider-­‐
able	  opposition	  and	  judicial	  reluctance,	  as	  the	  next	  sections	  describe.	  
D.	  	  Rejection	  of	  a	  Broad	  Application	  of	  Wyandotte:	  United	  States	  v.	  
City	  of	  Philadelphia	  
City	   of	   Philadelphia67	   arose	   in	   the	   context	   of	   widespread	   civil	  
rights	  violations	  by	  then-­‐mayor	  Frank	  Rizzo	  and	  Police	  Commissioner	  
Joseph	   F.	   O’Neill.	   Prior	   federal	   prosecutions	   of	   police	   officers	   for	   ex-­‐
tracting	  illegal	  confessions	  had	  not	  resulted	  in	  systemic	  change;	  in	  fact,	  
in	  at	  least	  one	  instance	  a	  convicted	  officer	  had	  subsequently	  been	  pro-­‐
moted.68	   The	   government	   sought	   an	   injunction	   against	   Fourteen	  
Amendment	   violations	   through	   implication	   from	   criminal	   provisions	  
found	   in	   the	   Civil	   Rights	   Acts	   of	   1866	   and	   1870	   and	   the	   Fourteenth	  
Amendment	   itself.	  The	  Third	  Circuit,	   in	  a	  5-­‐4	  decision	  denying	  a	  peti-­‐
tion	   for	   rehearing,	   rejected	   “the	   government’s	   suggestion	   that	   the	  
comprehensive	  analysis	  developed	  in	  the	  later	  [private	  right	  of	  action]	  
Supreme	   Court	   opinions	   must	   be	   discarded	   in	   favor	   its	   1967	  Wyan-­‐
dotte	  decision.”69	  
The	  United	  States’	   view,	   according	   to	   the	   court,	  was	   that	   “Wyan-­‐
dotte	  sets	  forth	  a	  different	  and	  more	  liberal	  test	  for	  recognition	  of	  im-­‐
plied	   rights	   of	   action	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   government”70	   and	   that	   the	  
decision	  supported	  broad	  injunctive	  relief	  because	  there	  were	  no	  “oth-­‐
er	   adequate	   means	   by	   which	   the	   United	   States	   can	   carry	   out	   its	   re-­‐
sponsibility.”71	  The	  basis	  for	  the	  court’s	  conclusion	  was	  that	  Wyandotte	  
	  
Wreck	   Act.	   Brief	   of	   the	   United	   States	   in	   Opposition	   at	   8,	   Southern	   Scrap	  Material	   Co.,	   L.L.C.	   v.	  
United	  States,	  No.	  08-­‐696	  (U.S.	  Feb.	  27,	  2009),	  2009	  WL	  526995.	  The	  United	  States	  has	  also	  ar-­‐
gued	   on	   occasion	   that	  Wyandotte	   was	   an	   implied	   right	   decision	   that	   preceded	   Sandoval	   and	  
should	  not	  be	  given	  current	  effect	   to	  endorse	  broad	  private	   implied	   rights.	  Brief	  of	   the	  Depart-­‐
ment	  of	  Transportation	  as	  Amicus	  Curiae,	  Boswell	  v.	  Skywest	  Airlines,	  Inc.,	  361	  F.3d	  1263	  (10th	  
Cir.	  2014)	  (No.	  02-­‐4188).	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  mentioned	  Wyandotte	   in	  an	   initial	  brief	   in	  
one	   of	   the	   actions	   brought	   by	   the	   government	   to	   quash	   state-­‐issued	   subpoenas	   to	   telephone	  
companies,	   it	   relied	   instead	   largely	   upon	   preemption	   and	   national	   security	   grounds	   when	   the	  
case	  was	  consolidated	  with	  others	  by	  a	  multidistrict	   litigation	  panel.	   In	   re	  National	  Sec.	  Agency	  
Telecommunications	   Records	   Litigation,	   633	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   892	   (N.D.	   Cal.	   2007).	   Cursory	   asides	  
were	  overlooked	  when	  courts	  readily	  accepted	  the	  narrower	  proposition	  that,	  in	  contexts	  such	  as	  
recovery	  of	  Medicaid	  overpayments	   and	  a	   suit	   to	  prohibit	   a	   college	   that	   received	   federal	   funds	  
from	   releasing	   student	   records	   in	   violation	  of	   federal	   law,	   the	  United	   States	   can	   sue	   to	   enforce	  
conditions	  on	  the	  receipt	  of	  funding.	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Lahey	  Clinic	  Hospital,	  Inc.,	  399	  F.3d	  
1,	  15	  (1st	  Cir.	  2005).	  	  	  
	   67.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  City	  of	  Philadelphia,	  644	  F.2d	  187	  (3d	  Cir.	  1981).	  	  
	   68.	   	  Stephen	  Rushin,	  Federal	  Enforcement	  of	  Police	  Reform,	  82	  FORDHAM	  L.	  REV.	  3189,	  3605-­‐
06	   (2104)	   (describing	   previous	   prosecutions,	   the	   City’s	   response,	   and	   statements	   by	   federal	  
officials	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  problems	  were	  “institutional”).	  
	   69.	   	  City	  of	  Philadelphia,	  644	  F.2d	  at	  191.	  
	   70.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   71.	   	  Id.	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did	  not	  establish	  a	  “different	  standard	   for	   inferring	  rights	  of	  action	   in	  
favor	  of	  the	  government”	  because	  the	  Court	  there	  stated	  that	   it	  relied	  
on	   “cases	   involving	  civil	   actions	  or	  private	  parties”72	  and	  cited	  Wyan-­‐
dotte	  in	  Cort	  “in	  developing	  further	  the	  test	  for	  inferring	  private	  rights	  
of	   action.”73	   Accordingly,	  Wyandotte	   had	   been	   superseded	   by	   subse-­‐
quent	  Supreme	  Court	  implied	  right	  decisions.	  Its	  “unrefined	  analysis”74	  
was	  “no	  longer	  an	  accurate	  statement	  of	  the	  law.”75	  
Judge	  Gibbons,	   in	  a	   lengthy	  dissent,	  accused	  the	  majority	  of	   “Cal-­‐
hounism”76	  and	  championed	  what	  he	  characterized	  as	  a	  distinct	  line	  of	  
analysis	  emanating	  from	  United	  States	  v.	  San	  Jacinto	  Tin,77	  United	  States	  
v.	   American	   Bell	   Telephone,78	   and	   In	   re	   Debs.79	   He	   argued	   that	   those	  
decisions	   supported	   the	   government’s	   position—which	   was	   largely	  
ignored	   by	   the	   plurality—that	   the	   claim	   was	   supported	   by	   inherent	  
authority	   that	   is	   not	   implied	   from	   a	   particular	   statute,	   but	   rather,	   in	  
this	   case,	   concerned	  a	   “constitutional	   duty	   to	  protect	   the	  public	   from	  
injury	   to	   the	  general	  welfare.”80	  Curiously,	   Judge	  Gibbons	  did	  not	  dis-­‐
cuss	  Wyandotte,	  though	  he	  did	  assert	  that	  “[i]t	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  perceive	  
no	  legislative	  intent	  to	  supplement	  the	  caseloads	  (and	  incomes)	  of	  pri-­‐
vate	   lawyers,	   and	   quite	   another	   to	   hold	   that	   the	   [Attorney	   Gen-­‐
eral].	  .	  .may	  not	  bring	  an	  action.”81	  City	  of	  Philadelphia	  is	  now	  accepted	  
more	  with	  resignation82—if	  not	  approval83—than	  with	  anger.	  With	  City	  
	  
	   72.	   	  Id.	   (quoting	   Wyandotte	   Transportation	   Company	   v.	   United	   States,	   389	   U.S.	   191,	   202	  
(1967)).	  
	   73.	   	  Id.	  at	  191–92	  (citing	  Cort	  v.	  Ash,	  422	  U.S.	  66,	  79	  (1975).).	  
	   74.	   	  Id.	  at	  192.	  
	   75.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   76.	   	  Id.	  at	  227	  (Gibbons,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  
	   77.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  San	  Jacinto	  Tin,	  125	  U.S.	  273	  (1888).	  	  
	   78.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  American	  Bell	  Telephone,	  128	  U.S.	  315	  (1888).	  	  
	   79.	   	  In	  re	  Debs,	  158	  U.S.	  564	  (1895).	  	  
	   80.	   	  City	  of	  Philadelphia,	  644	  F.2d	  at	  216	  (Gibbons,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  Because	  this	  article	  agrees	  
that	  those	  decisions	  were,	  indeed,	  the	  genesis	  of	  a	  distinct	  non-­‐statutory	  based	  authority	  residing	  
in	  the	  United	  States,	  they	  (and	  Judge	  Gibbons’	  dissent)	  will	  be	  discussed,	  along	  with	  their	  progeny,	  
in	  the	  next	  Part.	  Judge	  Gibbons	  did	  not,	  however,	  rely	  simply	  on	  those	  decisions,	  which	  were	  not	  
discussed,	  much	  less	  distinguished,	  in	  the	  majority	  opinion.	  He	  also	  sharply	  criticized	  the	  majority	  
for	  implicitly	  reversing	  its	  recent	  opinion	  in	  Halderman	  v.	  Penhurst	  State	  School	  and	  Hosp.,	  612	  
F.2d	  84	  (3d	  Cir.	  1979),	  rev’d	  and	  remanded	  on	  other	  grounds,	  Halderman	  v.	  Penhurst	  State	  School	  
and	  Hosp.,	  451	  U.S.	  1	  (1981),	  in	  which	  the	  court	  had	  permitted	  the	  United	  States	  to	  intervene	  in	  a	  
civil	   rights	  case.	  There,	   the	  Third	  Circuit	  had	  rejected	   the	  Fourth	  Circuit’s	  United	  States	  v.	  Solo-­‐
mon,	  563	  F.2d	  1121	  (4th	  Cir.	  1977),	  decision,	  which	  it	  now	  adopted.	  	  	  
	   81.	   	  City	  of	  Philadelphia,	  644	  F.2d	  at	  226	  (Gibbons,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  Gibbons	  argued	  that	  while	  
Cort	   “defined	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  private	  attorney	  general’s	  ability	   to	  enforce	  statutory	  rights”	   it	  had	  
“nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  authority.”	  Id.	  More	  attention	  was	  paid	  to	  the	  proposi-­‐
tion	  that	  the	  plurality’s	  Cort	  discussion	  was	  “an	  elaborate	  straw	  man”,	  id.	  at	  227,	  because	  express	  
statutory	  remedies	  were	  present.	  
	   82.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	   Rachel	  Harmon,	  Promoting	  Civil	   Rights	  Through	  Proactive	  Policing	  Reform,	   62	  
STAN.	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  3	  (2009).	  	  
	   83.	   	  	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  43.	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of	   Philadelphia’s	   summary	   treatment	   of	  Wyandotte,	   the	  United	   States	  
faced	  an	  uphill	  battle	  when	  it	  soon	  thereafter	  asked	  the	  same	  court	  to	  
find	  that	  the	  government	  has	  an	   implied	  right	  of	  action	  under	  the	  pa-­‐
tent	  statutes	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corporation.84	  
E.	  Denying	  the	  United	  States	  an	  Implied	  Right	  to	  Enforce	  a	  Patent	  
Statute:	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corporation	  
FMC	   Corporation,	   the	   only	   court	   of	   appeals	   decision	   to	   examine	  
whether	  the	  United	  States	  has	  an	  implied	  right	  of	  action	  under	  the	  pa-­‐
tent	  statutes,	  followed	  City	  of	  Philadelphia	  by	  only	  two	  and	  a	  half	  years.	  
The	  complaint	  sought	  declaratory	  and	  injunctive	  relief	  against	  FMC	  for	  
failing	  to	  file	  four	  written	  agreements	  between	  FMC	  and	  Bayer	  AG	  con-­‐
cerning	   the	   licensing	  and	  patenting	  of	   the	  pesticide	  carbofuran.85	  The	  
agreements	  appeared	  in	  the	  offices	  of	  the	  Antitrust	  Division	  ten	  years	  
later,	   in	   the	   course	  of	   an	   investigation	   concerning	  FMC.86	  The	  district	  
court,	   in	   reviewing	   the	  United	   States’	   complaint,	   noted	   that	   statutory	  
provision	  did	  not	  expressly	  grant	  a	  right	  of	  action	  to	  the	  United	  States	  
and	   that	   all	   of	   the	   prior	   litigation	   concerning	   it	   involved	  private	   par-­‐
ties.87	   It	   viewed	  Wyandotte	   as	   “suggest[ing]	   that	   the	   Court	   might	   be	  
more	   lenient	   in	   implying	   rights	   of	   action	   in	   the	   United	   States”88	   but	  
recognized	   that	   City	   of	   Philadelphia	   had	   stated	   that	   “Wyandotte	   was	  
not	  an	  accurate	  statement	  of	   the	   law,	  but	  had	  been	  narrowed	  by	  sub-­‐
sequent	  opinions”89	  with	  Cort	   setting	   forth	   the	   then-­‐applicable	   stand-­‐
ard.	  The	  court	  noted	  that	  City	  of	  Philadelphia	  had	  stated	  “in	  dictum	  that	  
the	  government	  might	  be	  required	  to	  meet	  the	  same	  standard	  as	  a	  pri-­‐
vate	  party	  to	  have	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  inferred	  in	  its	  favor.”90	  
	  
	   84.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corporation,	  717	  F.2d	  775	  (3d	  Cir.	  1983).	  	  
	   85.	   	  Id.	   at	  776.	  FMC	  held	   the	  United	  States	  patent,	   and	  marketed	   the	  pesticide	   through	   the	  
trade	  name	  Furadan.	  Apparently,	  the	  pesticide	  was	  invented	  at	  about	  the	  same	  time	  by	  both	  FMC	  
and	  Bayer,	  and	  both	  companies	  had	  applied	  for	  patents	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  in	  several	  other	  
countries.	  The	  PTO	  opened	  an	  interference	  proceeding	  in	  September	  1965	  to	  determine	  priority	  
of	  invention,	  and	  during	  the	  proceeding	  the	  companies	  engaged	  in	  extensive	  negotiations.	  After-­‐
wards,	   on	   September	   18,	   1968,	   only	   one	   of	   the	   agreements,	   the	   one	   pertaining	   to	   the	   United	  
States,	  was	  filed	  with	  the	  Patent	  Office	  under	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  135(c)	  (2012).	  That	  section,	  which	  was	  
added	   in	   1962,	   provides	   that	   any	   “agreement	   of	   understanding	   between	  parties	   to	   an	   interfer-­‐
ence”	  made	   “in	   connection	  with	   or	   in	   contemplation	   of	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   interference”	   be	  
filed	  with	  the	  PTO	  prior	  to	  termination	  of	  the	  interference	  proceeding.	  FMC,	  717	  F.2d	  at	  777.	  “The	  
sanction	  for	  the	  failure	  to	  file	  an	  agreement	  is	  the	  permanent	  unenforceability	  of	  both	  the	  patent	  
and	  the	  agreement.”	  Id.	  	  	  
	   86.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corp.,	  514	  F.	  Supp.	  1166	  (E.D.	  Pa.	  1981).	  
	   87.	   	  Id.	  at	  1168	  n.3	  (collecting	  cases).	  	  
	   88.	   	  Id.	  at	  1171.	  
	   89.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   90.	   	  Id.	  at	  1172.	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The	  Third	  Circuit	   agreed	   that	  Cort	  was	   applicable	   and	   that,	  with	  
particular	   reference	   to	   the	   first	   factor,	   the	   United	   States	  was	   not	   the	  
“especial	   beneficiary”	   of	   the	   legislation.91	   Significantly,	   the	   Antitrust	  
Division	  did	  not	  discuss	  Wyandotte	   in	  its	  brief92	  and	  relied	  exclusively	  
upon	  Cort.	  Nor,	  of	  course,	  had	  the	  district	  court	  relied	  on	  the	  proposi-­‐
tion	   that	  Wyandotte	   had	   any	   present	   value,	  much	   less	   on	   a	   rationale	  
that	  public	   implied	  rights	  are	  to	  be	  construed	  differently	   than	  private	  
ones.	  The	  Third	  Circuit,	  however,	  did	  not	  ignore	  the	  issue;	  it	  dedicated	  
several	  pages	  of	   its	  opinion	  to	  voicing	  concerns	  “against	  an	  expansive	  
judicial	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  implied	  remedies	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  
statutory	   rights.”93	   It	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   “de-­‐
voted	   considerably	   less	   attention	   to	   implied	   rights	   of	   action”	   by	   the	  
United	  States,94	  but	  concluded	  that	  because	  there	  had	  been	  changes	  in	  
the	  Court’s	  view	  concerning	  private	  implied	  rights,	  it	  was	  obligated	  to	  
“consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  reasoning	  in	  Wyandotte	  survives	  the	  
Court’s	   more	   recent	   analysis.”95	   It	   noted	   in	   passing	   that	  Wyandotte	  
concerned	   “two	   peculiarly	   important	   circumstances”96—the	   “urgent	  
necessity”	   of	   removing	   a	   “menace	   to	   the	   public	   health”	   that	   required	  
“immediate	  action”,97	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  “in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  im-­‐
plied	   remedy	   the	  negligent	   owner	  would	  profit	   by	   his	   own	  wrong.”98	  
Those	  were,	  however,	  not	  factual	  distinguishing	  grounds	  for	  the	  court.	  
Instead,	  it	  concluded,	  like	  the	  City	  of	  Philadelphia	  majority,	  that	  the	  law	  
of	   implied	   rights	   had	   changed,	   leaving	  Wyandotte	   behind	   and,	   effec-­‐
tively,	  reversed.	  That	  subsequent,	  “refined”99	  approach	  meant	  that	  the	  
capstone	   for	   recognition	   of	   an	   implied	   right	   of	   action	   in	   the	   govern-­‐
ment	  was,	  just	  as	  with	  private	  parties,	  congressional	  intent.	  
II.	  LOOKING	  BEYOND	  WYANDOTTE:	  THE	  INHERENT	  AUTHORITY	  POWER	  
A.	  Implications	  of	  the	  Limited	  Reach	  of	  Wyandotte,	  in	  General	  and	  
for	  Claims	  to	  Enforce	  Private	  Patents	  
Wyandotte	  has,	  despite	   the	  government’s	  efforts,	  been	  effectively	  
cabined	   to	   relatively	   insignificant	  quarrels	  about	   in	   rem	   and	   in	  perso-­‐
	  
	   91.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corporation,	  717	  F.2d	  775,	  790	  (3d	  Cir.	  1983)..	  
	   92.	   	  Reply	  Brief	  of	  Appellant	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  Brief	  for	  United	  States	  of	  America	  
as	  Cross-­‐Appellee,	  United	  States	  v.	  FMC	  Corp.,	  717	  F.2d	  775	  (3d	  Cir.	  1983)	  (No.	  82-­‐1605).	  	  
	   93.	   	  FMC,	  717	  F.2d	  at	  780.	  
	   94.	   	  Id.	  at	  782.	  
	   95.	   	  Id.	  
	   96.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   97.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   98.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   99.	   	  Id.	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nam	  jurisdiction	  regarding	  the	  Wreck	  Act	  and	  the	  RHA.100	  Indeed,	  Wy-­‐
andotte	   is	   at	   risk	   even	  with	   regard	   to	   its	   arguably	   circumscribed	  ori-­‐
gins.	  Because	  the	  decision	  concerned,	  as	  the	  Third	  Circuit	  noted	  in	  FMC	  
Corporation,	  a	   lawsuit	  by	  the	  United	  States	  to	  protect	   its	  corporate	  or	  
pecuniary	   interest,	   there	   is	   a	   good	   argument	   that	   it	   should	  be	   recon-­‐
sidered	   and	   limited,	   in	   light	   of	   Sandoval,	   even	   as	   to	   those	   types	   of	  
claims.	  That	  is	  because,	  as	  Seth	  Davis	  noted	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  analy-­‐
sis	  of	  public	  implied	  rights,	  when	  the	  United	  States	  sues	  in	  a	  corporate	  
capacity,	  it	  is	  “entitled	  to	  no	  more	  judicial	  solicitude	  than	  a	  private	  liti-­‐
gant.”101	  Accordingly,	  “when	  a	  public	  litigant	  sues	  in	  what	  amounts	  to	  a	  
private	  capacity”	  courts	  “should	  treat	   the	  public	   litigant	   like	  a	  private	  
litigant.”102	   Davis	   notes	   that	   “corporate	   capacity	   suits	   are	   indistin-­‐
guishable	  from	  the	  classic	  private	  beneficiary	  suit	  where	  a	  private	  liti-­‐
gant	   sues	   under	   a	   statute	   that	   creates	   a	   right	   for	   her	   benefit.”103	   He	  
contends	   that	   judicial	   application	   of	   private	   rights	   doctrine	   in	   such	  
cases	  is	  consistent	  with	  “the	  federal	  common	  law	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  ob-­‐
ligations	  of	   the	  United	  States”	   in	  “proprietary	  and	  contractual	  contro-­‐
versies.”104	  This	   is,	  of	   course,	   the	  same	  position	   that	  was	  championed	  
by	  the	  Third	  Circuit.	  It	  will	  continue	  to	  bedevil	  even	  narrowly	  tailored	  
proposed	  applications	  of	  Wyandotte.105	  
	  
	   100.	   	  Perhaps	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   negative	   Third	   Circuit	   rulings,	   the	  United	   States	   has	   subse-­‐
quently	  rarely	  invoked	  it	  outside	  of	  the	  RHA	  damage	  to	  locks	  or	  dams	  context.	  In	  particular,	  the	  
United	  States	  has	  not	  made	  another	  implied	  right	  claim	  under	  the	  patent	  laws.	  Nor	  has	  it	  sought	  
to	  apply	  Wyandotte	  more	  broadly	  with	  regard	  to	  proposed	  implied	  rights	  to	  enforce	  the	  environ-­‐
mental,	  other	  natural	  resource,	  or	  Indian	  laws.	  
	   101.	   	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  34.	  
	   102.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   103.	   	  Id.	  at	  35.	  
	   104.	   	  Id.	   at	   38.	   Seizing	  upon	  Davis’	   rationale,	   a	  party	   in	   a	  Wreck	  Act	  proceeding	  has	   argued	  
that	   the	   logical	   consequence	   of	   a	   claim	   that	   the	   government	   must	   be	   treated	   precisely	   like	   a	  
private	  party	  when	  it	  sues	  in	  its	  corporate	  interest	  is	  that	  Wyandotte	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  followed	  
even	  in	  the	  RHA	  context.	  Its	  holding	  and	  rationale,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  
parsimonious	  reach	  of	  the	  private	  implied	  rights	  cases.	  Reply	  Brief	  of	  Plaintiff—Appellant,	  In	  re:	  
American	   River	   Transportation	   Co.	   v.	   United	   States,	   2014	  WL	   3909288	   (8th	   Cir.	   filed	   July	   31,	  
2014).	  
	   105.	   	  This	  does	  not,	   however,	   necessarily	  mean	   that	  public	   implied	   rights	  of	   action	  have	  no	  
separate	  doctrinal	  origin,	  or	  that	  no	  claim	  can	  be	  made	  by	  the	  government	  outside	  of	  the	  narrow	  
reimbursement	  context.	  Davis	  argues	  convincingly	  that	  all	  public	  implied	  right	  claims	  should	  not	  
be	   uniformly	   treated	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   as	   private	   actions.	   Instead,	   judicial	   recognition	   of	   a	  
public	  implied	  right	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fundamental	  precept	  that	  “a	  federal	  court	  may	  elaborate	  the	  
remedial	   implications	   of	   federal	   law	   in	   a	   regulatory	   mode	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   an	   effective	   en-­‐
forcement	  system.”	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  5.	  While	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  implied	  public	  rights	  is	  
something	   of	   a	   “muddle”	   there	   are	   sound	   grounds	   for	   viewing	   the	   jurisdiction	   involving	  public	  
implied	  rights	  as	  “distinctive.”	  Id.	  at	  4,	  5.	  	  After	  all,	  as	  Wyandotte	  itself	  demonstrates,	  courts	  have	  
with	  some	  regularity	  and	  in	  certain,	  albeit	  typically	  narrow,	  contexts	  viewed	  pubic	  implied	  rights	  
as	  somehow	  different.	   In	  addition,	  there	  is	  the	  Powell	  dissent,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  less	  significant	  fact	  
that	  the	  Court	  has,	  since	  Cort,	  referred	  to	  “private”	  implied	  rights	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  Sandoval.	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Davis’	  rationale	  and	  typology	  for	  such	  claims	  does	  not,	  in	  any	  cat-­‐
egorization	   sense,	   rely	   exclusively	   on	  Wyandotte.	   However,	   if	   Davis’	  
taxonomy	   of	   four	   general	   categories	   of	   implied	   public	   rights—
”corporate,	   institutional,	   administrative,	   and	   substitutive”106—is	   ac-­‐
cepted	  and	  applied,	  a	  successful	  suit	  by	  the	  United	  States	  to	  enforce	  a	  
private	  patent	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  succeed	  as	  an	  implied	  right	  claim.	  A	  
suit	   to	   enforce	   a	  private	  party’s	  patent	  does	  not	   implicate	   the	  United	  
States’	  corporate	  or	  cost-­‐recovery	  interest,	  even	  if	  Wyandotte	  is	  viable	  
in	  that	  arena.	  In	  any	  event,	  as	  noted	  Davis	  argues	  that	  “corporate”	  suits	  
should	  be	  treated	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  an	  implied	  right	  suit	  by	  a	  pri-­‐
vate	  party,	  and	  he	  would	  assumedly	  agree	  that	  a	  public	  claim	  should	  be	  
rejected	   if	   Sandoval	   would	   require	   dismissal	   of	   a	   private	   suit.	   Since	  
there	   is	  no	  clear	  evidence	  of	  congressional	   intent	  to	  provide	  a	   federal	  
claim	  to	  seek	  injunctive	  relief,	  much	  less	  recovery	  of	  damages,	   for	  the	  
infringement	   of	   a	   private	   patent,	   a	   Davis	   corporate	   category	   public	  
implied	  right	  lawsuit	  would	  likely	  fail.	  
An	  institutional	  implied	  public	  right	  claim,	  one	  described	  by	  Davis	  
as	  an	  effort	  to	  “vindicate	  intergovernmental	  immunities	  or	  its	  authori-­‐
ty	   to	   regulate”107	   is,	   in	  a	  broad	  sense,	   instead	  a	   type	  of	   claim	   that	   the	  
Justice	   Department	   would	   likely	   advance	   in	   the	   private	   patent	   in-­‐
fringement	   context.	  There	  would	  ostensibly	  be	  an	  argument,	  perhaps	  
in	   the	   alternative,	   that	   the	   United	   States	   in	   attempting	   to	   address	   a	  
private	  patent	  infringement	  is	  seeking	  to	  redress	  “injuries	  to	  [its]	  polit-­‐
ical	   powers	   and	   rights”108	   even	   if	   it	   is	   not	   articulating	   specific	   tradi-­‐
tional	   grounds	   such	   as	   sovereign	   immunity,	   preemption,	   or	   the	  
government’s	   role	  as	   a	   trustee	   sovereign	  with	  plenary	  authority	  over	  
Indian	   tribes.109	   However,	   an	   implied	   right	   claim	   is	   not	   necessary	   in	  
such	  cases,	  and	  is	   in	  fact	   likely	  to	  be	  unsuccessful	   for	  the	  reasons	  dis-­‐
cussed	  above.	  Davis	  cites110	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  successful	  recent	  public	  
implied	  right	  suit	  claiming	  an	  institutional	  interest	  related	  to	  a	  statuto-­‐
ry	  context	  an	  action	  by	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Division	  for	  damages	  to	  enforce	  
the	  Servicemembers’	  Civil	  Relief	  Act.111	  But,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	  
the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  claim	  an	  implied	  right	  of	  action	  in	  that	  litiga-­‐
tion,	   and	   the	   court’s	   ruling	   was	   not	   on	   that	   basis.	   Instead,	   the	   court	  
accepted	   that	   the	   United	   States	   possesses	   a	   broad	   inherent,	   non-­‐
	  
	   106.	   	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  5.	  	  	  
	   107.	   	  Id.	  at	  6.	  
	   108.	   	  Id.	  at	  18.	  
	   109.	   	  Id.	  (referencing	  Cherokee	  Nation	  v.	  Georgia,	  30	  U.S.	  (5	  Pet.)	  1	  (1831)).	  	  	  
	   110.	   	  Id.	  at	  50.	  
	   111.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  B.C.	  Enterprises,	  Inc.,	  696	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  593,	  597	  (E.D.	  Va.	  2010),	  aff’d,	  447	  
Fed.	  App’x	  (4th	  Cir.	  2011).	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statutorily	  dependent	  enforcement	  authority.	  Nor	  does	  Davis	  reference	  
another	  recent	  federal	  opinion	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  public	  implied	  right	  
institutional	  category	  lawsuit	  not	  involving	  a	  preemption	  claim.112	  
Ultimately,	  Wyandotte	   provides	   an	   unstable	   foundation	   for	   suits	  
by	  the	  United	  States	  to	  address	  patent	  infringements,	  just	  as	  it	  does	  not	  
readily	   support	   application	   in	   the	   broader	   contexts	   in	   which	   it	   has	  
been	  advanced	  and	  might	  arguably	  apply.	  But	   that	   is	  not	  because	   the	  
Court	  initially	  erred	  in	  distinguishing	  public	  and	  private	  implied	  rights,	  
or	   because	   no	   such	   distinction	   exists,	   and	   certainly	   not	   because	   the	  
United	   States	   lacks	   any	   authority	   to	   sue	   in	   the	   types	   of	   lawsuits	   in	  
which	  Wyandotte	  has	  been	  cited.	  Instead,	  Wyandotte	  is	  hobbled	  by	  the	  
inherent	  limitations	  of	  any	  claim	  that	  is	  premised	  solely	  on	  implication	  
from	  a	  federal	  statute.	  Any	  implied	  rights	  claim,	  whether	  public	  or	  pri-­‐
vate,	   is	   linked	   to	   a	   particular	   statute	   rather	   than	   an	   inherent	   federal	  
power,	  and	  therefore	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  potential	  constraint	  of	  consistency	  
with	   prior	   congressional	   action.	   As	   Part	   I	   discussed,	   by	   their	   nature	  
such	   claims	   present	   serious	   questions	   of	   consistency	   with	   congres-­‐
sional	  action,	   the	  meaning	  of	  any	  congressional	   inaction,	  and	   the	  role	  
of	  the	  executive	  under	  the	  separation	  of	  powers.	  More	  generally,	  such	  
claims	   are	   examined	   skeptically	   by	   courts	   concerned	  with	   federalism	  
or	   separation	   of	   powers	   implications.113	   The	   search	   for	   a	   suitable	  
	  
	   112.	   	  See	   Davis,	   supra	   note	   13,	   at	   49	   (discussing	   Arizona	   v.	   United	   States,	   132	   S.	   Ct.	   2492	  
(2012)).	  A	  patent	  infringement	  public	  implied	  right	  claim	  could,	  again	  applying	  Davis’	  classifica-­‐
tion	   scheme,	   alternatively	   be	   classified	   as	   an	   “administrative”	   one,	   in	   which	   the	   “government	  
litigant	   claims	  an	   implied	   right	   of	   action	   as	   an	   adjunct	   to	   its	   administrative	   authority	   to	   imple-­‐
ment	  federal	  objectives.”	  Id.	  at	  20.	  Administrative	  cases,	   to	  Davis,	  are	  “full	  of	  contradictions.”	  Id.	  
Davis	  cites	  In	  re	  Debs,	  158	  U.S.	  564	  (1895),	  as	  an	  administrative	  implied	  right	  case,	  Davis,	  supra	  
note	  13,	  at	  21,	  but	  as	  discussed	   in	   the	  next	  Part	   the	  Court’s	   ruling	  did	  not	   imply	  a	   right	   from	  a	  
statute	  but	  rather	  recognized	  a	  broader,	  inherent	  authority.	  In	  addition,	  while	  Davis	  sees	  adminis-­‐
trative	   implied	  right	  claims	   in	  which	  the	  government	  contends	  that	  an	  action	   is	  consistent	  with	  
and	  enforces	  a	  statutory	  interest	  as	  unhampered	  by	  narrow	  or	  specific	  statutory	  remedial	  provi-­‐
sions,	  he	  recognizes	  that	  such	  suits	  are	  “to	  enforce	  Congress’	  will”,	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  21,	  and	  
therefore	  agrees	  that	  courts	  analyzing	  such	  claims	  should	  look	  at	  a	  statute’s	  language	  and	  legisla-­‐
tive	   history	   to	   determine	   consistency	  with	   congressional	   objectives.	   To	   that	   end,	   congressional	  
refusal	  regarding	  a	  proposed	  federal	  enforcement	  mechanism	  or	  remedy	  is	  telling,	  and	  therefore	  
Davis	   believes	   FMC	   Corporation	   was	   correctly	   decided	   because	   the	   legislative	   history	   there	  
showed	  “Congress	  had	  rejected	  additional	  enforcement	  mechanisms.”	  Id.	  at	  60.	  Davis	  goes	  further	  
to	  agree	  that	  if	  Congress	  sets	  forth	  an	  explicit	  enforcement	  mechanism—as	  it	  has	  with	  regard	  to	  
patentees—recognition	  of	  an	  implied	  statutory	  right	  would	  likely	  “contravene	  the	  congressional	  
scheme.”	  Id.	  at	  54.	   	  None	  of	  Davis’	  categories	  are	  a	  good	  fit	  for	  a	  suit	  by	  the	  United	  States	  to	  en-­‐
force	  a	  patent	  issued	  to	  a	  private	  party.	  	  
	   113.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	   Alexander	   v.	   Sandoval,	   532	  U.S.	   275,	   286	   (2001).	   (“private	   rights	   of	   action	   to	  
enforce	   federal	   law	  must	   be	   created	   by	   Congress”);	   Boswell	   v.	   Skywest	   Airlines,	   Inc.,	   361	   F.3d	  
1263,	  1267	  (10th	  Cir.	  2004)	  (“the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  emphasized	  that	  the	  private	  right	  of	  action	  
inquiry	   focuses	   on	   the	   Congressional	   intent	   underlying	   the	   particular	   statute	   at	   issueFalse”);	  
United	   States	   v.	   City	   of	   Philadelphia,	   644	   F.2d	   187,	   194–199	   (3d	   Cir.	   1981).;	   United	   States	   v.	  
Mattson,	   600	   F.2d	   1295,	   1299–1300	   (9th	   Cir.	   1979);	   United	   States	   v.	   Solomon,	   563	   F.2d	   1121,	  
1125	  (4th	  Cir.	  1977).	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broad	  and	   sustainable	  doctrine	   that	  both	   justifies	   suits	  by	   the	  United	  
States	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts	  and	  particularly	  may	  encompass	  actions	  
seeking	  relief	  from	  private	  patent	  infringement	  therefore	  must	  contin-­‐
ue.	  While	  authority	  for	  such	  actions	  arguably	  exists,	  it	  has	  infrequently	  
been	  summoned,	  and	  has	  been	  characterized	  as	  either	  a	  historical	  arti-­‐
fact	   or	   viewed	   as	   limited	   to	   several	   categories	   of	   particular	   federal	  
importance.	   Its	  parameters,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  reported	  decisions,	  are	   im-­‐
precise.	   Yet	   its	   perseverance,	   through	   invocation	   by	   the	   Justice	   De-­‐
partment	   in	   several	   recent	   lawsuits	   and	   judicial	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
argument,	  cannot	  be	  ignored.114	  
B.	  The	  Inherent,	  Non-­‐Statutory	  Federal	  Right	  of	  Action:	  Its	  Past,	  
Present,	  and	  (Possibly)	  Future	  
Several	   never	   overruled	  decisions	   suggest	   that	   the	  United	   States	  
has	  broad	  authority	   to	  bring	  suit	   in	   federal	  court	   to	  protect	   its	  sover-­‐
eign	  or	  proprietary	  interests.115	  It	  seems	  uncontroversial	  that	  the	  Unit-­‐
ed	   States	   may,	   as	   a	   sovereign,	   and	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   explicit	  
statutory	  authority	  and	  independent	  of	  any	  derived	  implied	  right,	  sue	  
	  
	   114.	   	  Two	   other	   potential	   grounds	   for	   a	   federal	   cause	   of	   action	   are	   worthy	   of	   discussion;	  
neither	   can	   alone	   justify	   a	   federal	   claim.	   On	   occasion,	   but	   rarely	   in	   modern	   cases,	   the	   United	  
States	  has	  asserted	  that	  28	  U.S.C.	  §§	  516	  &	  518	  (2012),	  which	  respectively	  provide	  that	  the	  “con-­‐
duct	  of	  litigation”	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  is	  a	  party	  is	  “reserved	  to	  officers	  of	  the	  Department	  
of	  Justice”	  and	  that	  the	  Attorney	  General	  may	  “personally	  conduct	  and	  argue	  any	  case	  in	  a	  court	  of	  
the	  United	  States	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  is	  interested”	  provide	  statutory	  support	  for	  a	  federal	  
cause	  of	  action.	  In	  United	  States	  v.	  California,	  332	  U.S.	  19,	  27	  (1947),	  the	  Court	  accepted	  the	  prem-­‐
ise	  that	  predecessor	  statutes	  granted	  a	  right	  of	  action	  to	  the	  United	  States	  “to	  safeguard	  national	  
interests.”	  Most	  courts,	  however,	  have	  viewed	   the	  provisions	  as	  mere	   “housekeeping,”	  Solomon,	  
563	  F.2d	  at	  1124,	  measures	  that,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Section	  516,	  “authorizes	  the	  Attorney	  General	  to	  
bring	  an	  action	  where	  there	   is	   independent	  statutory	  authority.”	  Mattson,	  600	  F.2d	  at	  2987	  n.1.	  
Another	  potential,	  but	  also	  unlikely,	  basis	  for	  a	  federal	  claim	  is	  the	  United	  States	  acting	  as	  a	  “qua-­‐
si-­‐sovereign”	  under	  the	  parens	  patriae	  doctrine.	  That	  doctrine,	  as	  long	  applied	  to	  the	  states,	  pro-­‐
vides	   that	   a	   state	   government	   may	   bring	   a	   claim	   when	   it	   acts	   to	   address	   an	   injury	   to	   the	  
population	  at	  large,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  substantial	  segment	  of	  the	  population.	  There	  are,	  in	  contrast,	  very	  
few	  instances	  in	  which	  courts	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  a	  parens	  patriae	  interest.	  
See,	  e.g.,	  Massachusetts	  v.	  Mellon,	  262	  U.S.	  447,	  485	  (1923)	  (dicta;	  state	  lacks	  authority	  when	  its	  
power	   derives	   from	   federal	   law).	   Acceptance	   of	   parens	   patriae	   would	   at	   best	   confer	   standing	  
rather	  than	  demonstrate	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  cause	  of	  action.	  Hawaii	  v.	  Standard	  Oil	  Co.	  of	  Cal.,	  405	  
U.S.	  251,	  259	  (1972)	  (parens	  patriae	  does	  not	  confer	  cause	  of	  action);	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  13	  
(referring	  to	  “parens	  patriae	  standing”);	  Ryke	  Longest,	  Massachusetts	  versus	  EPA:	  Parens	  Patriae	  
Vindicated,	  18	  DUKE	  ENVTL.	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  F.	  277,	  277	  n.3	  (2008)	  (distinguishing).	  As	  noted	  below,	  infra	  
note	  180,	  parens	  patriae	  status	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  have	  standing	  in	  an	  action	  
to	  enforce	  a	  private	  patent.	  
	   115.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  In	  re	  Debs,	  158	  U.S.	  564,	  584	  (1895)	  (“Every	  government.	  .	  .has	  a	  right	  to	  apply	  
to	  its	  own	  courts	  for	  any	  proper	  assistance	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  [its	  powers]	  and	  the	  discharge	  of	  [its	  
duties].”);	  Sanitary	  District	  of	  Chicago	  v.	  United	  States,	  266	  U.S.	  405	  (1925)	  (obstruction	  to	  navi-­‐
gation);	  Heckman	  v.	  United	  States,	  224	  U.S.	  413,	  438–41	  (1912)	  (Indian	  allotment	  conveyances);	  
United	  States	  v.	  American	  Bell	  Tel.	  Co.,	  128	  U.S.	  315,	  367	  (1888)	  (suit	  to	  cancel	  patents	  obtained	  
by	  fraud).	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to	  recover	  pecuniary	  losses.116	  Likewise,	  courts	  readily	  accept	  that	  the	  
United	  States	  may	  sue	  absent	  statutory	  authorization	  to	  enforce	  a	  con-­‐
tractual	  obligation.117	  What	  has	  proven	  more	  unsettled	  is	  whether	  this	  
inherent,	   non-­‐statutorily-­‐based	   power	   extends	   to	   remedy	   alleged	   in-­‐
fractions	   of	   the	   government’s	   non-­‐proprietary	   sovereignty	   interests,	  
and	  if	  so,	  how	  the	  interest	  is	  defined	  and	  in	  which	  contexts	  the	  authori-­‐
ty	  may	  be	  expressed.	  The	  “(in)famous”118	  ruling	  in	  In	  re	  Debs119	  which	  
concerned	   the	   Pullman	   Strike	   of	   1894	   and	   upheld	   the	   government’s	  
non-­‐statutory,	   inherent	   right	   to	   sue	   even	  when	   it	   had	   “no	   pecuniary	  
interest	  in	  the	  controversy”,120	  has,	  in	  the	  commentary,	  been	  criticized	  
as	  a	  vast	  overreach	  of	  federal	  authority,121	  marginalized	  as	  “an	  anoma-­‐
ly	   that	   has	   not	   since	   had	   generative	   power”,122	   classified	   as	   a	   long-­‐
bygone	   example	   of	   “judicial	   boundness”,123	   categorized	   as	  merely	   an	  
action	   “to	   protect	   the	   public	   interest	   in	   the	   free	   flow	   of	   interstate	  
commerce”	  through	  mail	  delivery,124	  described	  as	  limited	  to	  instances	  
	  
	   116.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Snapp	  &	  Son,	  458	  U.S.	  at	  601–02	  (“As	  a	  proprietor,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  same	  
interests	  as	  other	  similarly	  situated	  proprietors.	  And	  like	  other	  such	  proprietors	  it	  may	  at	  times	  
need	  to	  pursue	  those	  interests	  in	  court.”);	  United	  States	  v.	  Standard	  Oil	  Co.,	  332	  U.S.	  301,	  315	  n.22	  
(1947)	  (“not	  been	  necessary	  for	  Congress	  to	  pass	  statutes	   imposing	  civil	   liability	   in	  those	  situa-­‐
tions”);	  Kern	  River	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States,	  257	  U.S.	  147	  (1921);	  Loftin	  Cotton	  v.	  United	  States,	  52	  U.S.	  
229	  (1850)	  (suit	  in	  trespass	  “as	  a	  corporation	  or	  body	  politic,”	  id.	  at	  231,	  for	  money	  damages	  for	  
conversion	  of	  timber,	  when	  government	  could	  have	  brought	  criminal	  action);	  United	  States	  v.	  San	  
Jacinto	  Tin	  Co.,	   125	  U.S.	   273	   (1888);	  91	  C.J.S.	   §§	  175	   (“same	   right	   as	   a	  private	  owner	   to	   sue	   to	  
protect	  its	  property”),	  176	  (“(T)he	  United	  may	  sue	  those	  who	  commit	  tortious	  acts	  which	  result	  in	  
pecuniary	  loss	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  .	  .”).	  
	   117.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   United	   States	   v.	   Marion	   County	   School	   Dist.,	   625	   F.2d	   607,	   615-­‐17	   (5th	   Cir.	  
1980).	  This	   is	  distinct	  from	  suits	   in	  which	  a	  governmental	  entity	  seeks	  to	  recover	  costs	  that	  are	  
incurred	   through	   tax-­‐supported	   services.	   See,	   e.g.,	   District	   of	   Columbia	   v.	   Air	   Florida,	   Inc.,	   750	  
F.2d	  1077	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1984)	  (no	  common	  law	  recovery	  for	  costs	  of	  emergency	  services	  and	  cleanup	  
after	  air	  disaster).	  
	   118.	   	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  21.	  
	   119.	   	  In	  re	  Debs,	  158	  U.S.	  564	  (1895).	  
	   120.	   	  Id.	   at	  586.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	   ruling	  as	  part	  of	   the	   judicial	  expansion	  of	   injunctive	  
relief	  in	  labor	  disputes,	  see	  Nirej	  S.	  Sekhon,	  Punitive	  Injunctions,	  17	  U.	  PA.	  J.	  L.	  &	  SOC.	  CHANGE	  175,	  
207-­‐10	  (2014).	  See	  also	  David	  Gray	  Adler,	  The	  Steel	  Seizure	  Case	  and	  Inherent	  Presidential	  Power,	  
19	  CONST.	  COMMENT.	  155,	  183-­‐88	  (2002)	  (In	  re	  Debs	  did	  not	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  
inherent	  executive	  power).	  	  
	   121.	   	  Kenneth	  M.	  Casebeer,	   “Public.	  .	  .Since	  Time	   Immemorial”:	  The	  Labor	  History	  of	  Hague	   v.	  
CIO,	  66	  RUTGERS	  L.	  REV.	  147,	  149	  (2103)	  (example	  of	   judicial	  suppression	  of	   free	  assembly);	  Mi-­‐
chael	  P.	  Van	  Alstine,	  Constitutional	  Necessity	  and	  Presidential	  Prerogative:	  Does	  Presidential	  Discre-­‐
tion	   Undergird	   or	   Undermine	   the	   Constitution?,	   45	   TULSA	   L.	   REV.	   631,	   646	   (2010)	   (“erroneous	  
conflation	  of	  executive	  and	  national	  power”);	  Recent	  Development,	  United	  States	  Has	  Nonstatuto-­‐
ry	  Standing	  To	  Sue	  To	  Enforce	  Policies	  of	  a	  Federal	  Statute,	  64	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  951,	  955	  (1964)	  (non-­‐
statutory	   inherent	  authority	  would	  mean	   that	   “the	  United	  States	  would	  have	  standing	   to	  sue	   to	  
implement	   the	   policies	   of	   any	   statute,	   notwithstanding	   the	   absence	   of	   	   express	   congressional	  
authorization,	  a	  result	  Congress	  certainly	  never	  contemplated	  nor	  the	  courts	  ever	  suggested.”).	  
	   122.	   	  Robert	  J.	  Reinstein,	  The	  Limits	  of	  Executive	  Power,	  59	  AM.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  259,	  319	  (2009).	  
	   123.	   	  DUNCAN	  KENNEDY,	  THE	  RISE	  AND	  FALL	  OF	  CLASSICAL	  LEGAL	  THOUGHT	  253	  (2006).	  
	   124.	   	  Tara	  Lee	  Grove,	  Standing	  as	  an	  Article	  II	  Nondelegation	  Doctrine,	  11	  U.	  PA.	  J.	  CONST.	  L.	  781,	  
793	  (2009).	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in	  which	  the	  government	  has	  an	  obligation	  or	  duty	  to	  act,125	  limited	  to	  
infrequent	   and	   true	   national	   emergencies	   or	   instances	   of	   domestic	  
unrest,126	  or	  actions	  “to	  protect	  national	  security	   interests	  and	  to	  vin-­‐
dicate	   constitutional	   rights”,127	   and	   disparaged	   as	   elevating	   private	  
property	   rights	   over	   the	   Bill	   of	   Rights.128	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   notable	  
criticism	  came	  from	  Henry	  P.	  Monaghan,	  who	  stated	  that	  In	  re	  Debs	  can	  
constitutionally	   be	   justified	   only	   if	   it	   is	   viewed	   as	   endorsing	   the	   “use	  
[of]	  force	  as	  necessary	  to	  enforce	  federal	  law	  when	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  
normal	   civil	   process	  has	  occurred,	   and	  not	  only	   to	  defend	   the	  United	  
States	   against	   sudden	   attack,	   but	   also	   to	   ‘protect’	   the	   government’s	  
personnel,	  property,	  and	  instrumentalities.”129	  
Yet	  In	  Re	  Debs,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  broad	  non-­‐statutory	  in-­‐
herent	   power	   to	   sue,	   has	   its	   academic	   supporters.130	   And	   while	   the	  
Court’s	  rationale	  was	  partially	   justified	  by	  the	  desirability	  of	  ensuring	  
delivery	  of	  mail,	  what	   to	  make	  of	   the	  statement	   that	   “[e]very	  govern-­‐
ment,	  entrusted,	  by	  the	  very	  terms	  of	  its	  being,	  with	  powers	  and	  duties	  
to	  be	  exercised	  and	  discharged	   for	   the	  general	  welfare,	  has	  a	   right	   to	  
apply	  to	  its	  own	  courts	  for	  any	  proper	  assistance	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  
one	   and	   the	   discharge	   of	   the	   other.”131	   Similarly,	   the	   Court’s	   earlier	  
statement	  in	  San	  Jacinto	  Tin132	  that	  government	  has	  “enormous	  power”	  
and	  the	  suggestion	  that	  American	  Bell	  Telephone133	   infers	  an	  ability	  to	  
	  
	   125.	   	  Davis,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  21.	  
	   126.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Michael	  Bahar,	  The	  Presidential	   Intervention	  Principle:	  The	  Domestic	  Use	  of	   the	  
Military	   and	   the	   Power	   of	   the	   Several	   States,	   5	   HARV.	   NAT’L	   SEC.	   J.	   537,	   597	   (2104);	   Anthony	  
O’Rourke,	  Theorizing	  American	  Freedom,	  110	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  1101,	  1106	  (2012);	  Martin	  H.	  Scheffer,	  
Does	  Absolute	  Power	  Corrupt	  Absolutely?,	  24	  OKLA.	  CITY	  L.	  REV.	  233,	  261-­‐63	  (1999);	  Note,	  Nonstat-­‐
utory	   Executive	   Authority	   to	   Bring	   Suit,	   85	   HARV.	   L.	   REV.	   1566,	   1575,	   1581	   (1972)	   [hereinafter	  
HARVARD	  NOTE].	  
	   127.	   	  Note,	  Protecting	  the	  Public	   Interest:	  Nonstatutory	  Suits	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  89	  YALE	  L.J.	  
118,	  136	  (1979)	  [hereinafter	  YALE	  NOTE].	  	  
	   128.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Gerard	  N.	  Magliocca,	  Why	  Did	  the	   Incorporation	  of	   the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  Fail	   in	   the	  
Late	   Nineteenth	   Century?,	   94	  MINN.	   L.	   REV.	   102,	   131-­‐36	   (2009);	   J.	   Gordon	   Hylton,	  The	   Perils	   of	  
Popularity:	  David	   Josiah	  Brewer	  and	   the	  Politics	  of	   Judicial	  Reputation,	  62	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  567,	  579	  
(2009).	  
	   129.	   	  Henry	   P.	   Monaghan,	   The	   Protective	   Power	   of	   the	   Presidency,	   93	   COLUM.	   L.	   REV.	   1,	   66	  
(1993).	  
	   130.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Joseph	  W.	  Mead,	  Interagency	  Litigation	  and	  Article	  III,	  47	  GA.	  L.	  REV.	  1217,	  1227	  
(2013)	  (declaring	  that	  “an	  inherent	  aspect	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  the	  right	  to	  invoke	  the	  nation’s	  courts	  
to	   enforce	   its	   sovereign	  prerogatives”);	   John	  C.	  Duncan,	   Jr.,	  A	  Critical	   Consideration	  of	  Executive	  
Orders:	  Glimmerings	  of	  Autopoiesis	  in	  the	  Executive	  Role,	  35	  VT.	  L.	  REV.	  333,	  373	  (2010)	  (In	  re	  Debs	  
“supports	  the	  expansive	  view	  of	  presidential	  power”);	  Aaron-­‐Andrew	  P.	  Bruhl,	  Return	  of	  the	  Line	  
Item	  Veto?	  Legalities,	  Practicalities,	  and	  Some	  Puzzles,	  10	  U.	  PA.	  J.	  CONST.	  L.	  447,	  493	  (2008)	  (sug-­‐
gesting	  expansive	  authority).	  
	   131.	   	  In	  re	  Debs,	  158	  U.S.	  564,	  584	  (1895)..	  
	   132.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  San	  Jacinto	  Tin	  Co.,	  125	  U.S.	  273,	  284	  (1888).	  	  
	   133.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  American	  Bell	  Tel.	  Co.,	  128	  U.S.	  315	  (1888).	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sue	  to	  “fill	  in	  the	  interstices	  of	  a	  statutory	  scheme”134	  suggest,	  through	  
what	   one	   unpersuaded	   court	   tagged	   as	   “high-­‐flying	   rhetoric”135	   a	   po-­‐
tentially	  unbridled	  authority.	  The	  language	  is	  indeed	  nebulous	  and	  the	  
interpretative	  case	  law	  is	  both	  sparse136	  and	  unrevealing.	  Courts	  have	  
rarely	  attempted	  to	  opine	  on	  the	  constitutional	  basis	  for	  the	  “right.”137	  
To	  the	  extent	  commentators	  have	  addressed	  the	  question,	  it	  has	  large-­‐
ly	  been	   in	   the	   larger	  realm	  of	  executive	  unilateral	  action.138	  The	  most	  
typical	   adverse	   judicial	   response	   is	   to	   list	   the	   kinds	   of	   decisions	   that	  
have	  cited	  and	  applied	  In	  re	  Debs,	  San	  Jacinto,	  and	  Sanitary	  District	  or	  
American	  Bell	  Telephone,	   classify	   them	  by	   the	  subject	  matter	  at	   issue,	  
and	  conclude	  that	   the	  authority,	  however	  defined	  and	   from	  wherever	  
derived,	   surely	  must	  be	   limited	   to	   the	   listed	  arenas.	  Yes,	   those	  courts	  
concede,	  there	  are	  categories,	  but	  they	  admit	  of	  no	  exceptions,	  and	  no	  
other	  classifications	  or	  variations	  are	  possible.	  
But	   the	  categories	   themselves,	  as	  established	  by	  courts	   that	  seek	  
to	  limit	  the	  import	  of	  In	  re	  Debs,	  are	  inconsistent.	  For	  example,	  in	  Unit-­‐
ed	  States	  v.	  Solomon139	  the	  Fourth	  Circuit	  in	  rejecting	  the	  government’s	  
Fourteenth	   Amendment	   enforcement	   effort	   	   described	   the	   “doctrine”	  
as	  anything	  that	  permits	  the	  United	  States	  to	  sue	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
express	  or	   implied	  statutory	  authority140	  and	  categorized	  the	  cases	  as	  
	  
	   134.	   	  United	   States	   v.	   City	   of	   Philadelphia,	   644	   F.2d	   187,	   216	   (3d	   Cir.	   1981).	   (Gibbons,	   J.,	  
dissenting).	  
	   135.	   	  In	  re	  National	  Security	  Agency	  Telecommunications	  Records	  Litigation,	  633	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  
892,	  900	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  2007).	  
	   136.	   	  See	  ERWIN	  CHEMERINSKY,	  FEDERAL	  JURISDICTION	  §	  2.3	  (4th	  ed.	  2003)	  (“little	  has	  been	  made	  
of	   this	   broad	   authorization	   to	   sue	   [since]	   in	   most	   instances,	   the	   federal	   government	   has	   sued	  
pursuant	  to	  federal	  statutes	  and	  not	  based	  on	  its	  inherent	  interest	  in	  protecting	  its	  citizens.”).	  
	   137.	   	  But	  see	  City	  of	  Philadelphia,	  644	  F.2d	  at	  199	  (rejecting	  Take	  Care	  Clause	  as	  basis);	  Id.	  at	  
217	  (Gibbons,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  (suggesting	  that	  it	  may	  derive	  “from	  the	  constitutional	  duty	  to	  pro-­‐
tect	   the	  public	   from	   injury	   to	   the	  public	  welfare.”);	  United	  States	  v.	   Solomon,	  419	  F.	   Supp.	  358,	  
372	  (D.	  Md.	  1976),	  aff’d,	  563	  F.2d	  1121	  (4th	  Cir.	  1977)	  (same).	  
	   138.	   	  Some	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  executive’s	  authority	  derives	  from	  the	  Take	  Care	  Clause,	  
see,	  e.g.,	  Peter	  Margulies,	  Taking	  Care	  of	  Immigration	  Law:	  Presidential	  Stewardship,	  Prosecutorial	  
Discretion,	   and	   the	   Separation	   of	   Powers,	   94	   B.U.	   L.	   REV.	   105,	   129	   (2014)	   (authority	   under	   the	  
Clause	   encompasses	   “values	   underlying	   the	   Framers’	   vision	   of	   a	   strong	   federal	   government”);	  
Grove,	  supra	  note	  124,	  at	  794	  (noting	  that	  the	  Clause	  supports	  executive	  standing	  in	  enforcement	  
actions);	  HARVARD	  NOTE,	  supra	  note	  126,	  at	  1567,	  while	  others	  point	  concurrently	  or	  alternatively	  
to	  the	  Vesting	  Clause,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Bruce	  A.	  Ledewitz,	  The	  Power	  of	  the	  President	  to	  Enforce	  the	  Four-­‐
teenth	  Amendment,	  52	  TENN.	  L.	  REV.	  605,	  669–76	  (1985),	  or	  to	  an	  omnibus	  executive	  “completion	  
power.”	  Jack	  Goldsmith	  &	  John	  F.	  Manning,	  The	  President’s	  Completion	  Power,	  115	  YALE	  L.J.	  2280,	  
2302-­‐11	  (2006).	  See	  Thomas	  P.	  Crocker,	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  Constitutional	  Responsibility,	  52	  
B.C.	  L.	  REV.	  1551,	  1555–60	  (2001)	  (surveying,	  in	  analyzing	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  executive	  to	  act	  in	  
the	  absence	  of	  statutory	  authority,	   the	  debate).	  But	  see	  YALE	  NOTE,	  supra	  note	  127,	  at	  138	  (con-­‐
tending	   that	  nonstatutory	   inherent	  authority	  suits	  should	  be	  delimited	  because	   “the	  creation	  of	  
remedies	  is	  characteristically	  a	  legislative,	  rather	  than	  an	  executive,	  function.”).	  	  
	   139.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Solomon,	  563	  F.2d	  1121,	  1126	  (4th	  Cir.	  1977).	  
	   140.	   	  Id.	  at	  1126.	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involving	  suits	  to	  protect	  a	  property	  right,	  to	  “protect	  the	  public”,141	  to	  
act	   as	   “guardian	   of	   the	   Indian	   tribes”,142	   to	   protect	   “national	   securi-­‐
ty”143	   and,	   in	   order	   to	   preclude	   the	   government’s	   claim	   in	   that	   case,	  
when	   interstate	  commerce	   is	   “obstructed	  by	  a	  denial	  of	  civil	   rights	   in	  
violation	   of	   some	   congressional	   enactment.”144	   With	   the	   prior	   deci-­‐
sions	   posited	   in	   that	  manner,	   the	   court	  was	   able	   to	   reject	   as	   an	   “ex-­‐
treme	   reading”145	   United	   States	   v.	   Brand	   Jewelers,	   Inc.146	   which	   had	  
applied	  In	  re	  Debs	  to	  enjoin,	  under	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	  a	  jew-­‐
eler	   from	  engaging	   in	   sham	  service	  practices	  prior	   to	  obtaining	   judg-­‐
ments	  by	  default.147	  Yet	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit,	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  Solomon	  and	  
reaching	  the	  same	  conclusion	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  
bring	  a	  suit	   to	  enforce	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	   in	  United	  States	  v.	  
Mattson	  both	  defined	  the	  doctrine	  differently—”some	  interest	  that	  can	  
be	  construed	  to	  warrant	  an	  implicit	  grant	  of	  authority”148	  –and	  limited	  
it	  to	  “a	  property	  interest,	   interference	  with	  national	  security	  or	  a	  bur-­‐
den	  on	  interstate	  commerce.”149	  At	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  First	  Cir-­‐
cuit	  confined	  the	  doctrine	  to	  undefined	  “great	  moment[s]	  of	  urgency,”	  
“fraud	  on	   the	  United	  States”	  and	   instances	  of	   “fiduciary	  duty	  owed	   to	  
an	  individual	  such	  as	  would	  justify	  suit	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  constitution-­‐
al	  grant.”150	  The	  supportive	  courts	  have	  been	  of	  no	  greater	  assistance.	  
More	  recently,	   the	  district	  court	   in	  the	  consolidated	  In	  re	  National	  Se-­‐
curity	   Agency	   Telecommunications	   Records	   Litigation,151	   approving	   a	  
government	  request	   for	  an	   injunction	  prohibiting	   five	  states	   from	  en-­‐
forcing	   subpoenas	   issued	   to	   telephone	   companies	   in	   the	  wake	  of	  dis-­‐
closures	   of	   customer	   information	   to	   the	   National	   Security	   Agency,	  
thought	   better	   of	   Brand	   Jewelers	   by	   bestowing	   upon	   it	   a	   distinctive	  
category.	  The	  court	  viewed	  the	  “circumstances”	  in	  which	  In	  re	  Debs	  had	  
been	   invoked	  and	  applied	  as	  “suits	   to	  enforce	   immunity	  of	   the	  armed	  
forces	   from	   certain	   state	   taxes”,	   to	   “enforce	   civil	   rights	   under	   the	  
Commerce	  Clause”,	  to	  “enjoin	  sellers	  from	  obtaining	  default	  judgments	  
	  
	   141.	   	  Id.	  (citing	  San	  Jacinto	  and	  American	  Bell	  Telephone).	  	  
	   142.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   143.	   	  Id.	  at	  1127.	  
	   144.	   	  Id.	  at	  1128.	  
	   145.	   	  Id.	  	  
	   146.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Brand	  Jewelers,	  Inc.,	  318	  F.	  Supp.	  1293,	  1298–99	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1971).	  
	   147.	   	  For	  a	  contemporaneous	  criticism	  of	  Brand	  Jewelers,	  see	  HARVARD	  NOTE,	  supra	  note	  126,	  at	  
1576–77	  &	  n.52.	  
	   148.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Mattson,	  600	  F.2d	  1295,	  1298	  (9th	  Cir.	  1979).	  
	   149.	   	  Id.	  at	  1298–99.	  
	   150.	   	  Ruotolo	  v.	  Ruotolo,	  572	  F.2d	  336,	  339-­‐40	  (1st	  Cir.	  1978).	  
	   151.	   	  In	  re	  National	  Security	  Agency	  Telecommunications	  Records	  Litigation,	  633	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  
892	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  2007).	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without	  proper	  service	  of	  process”,	  and	  “in	  disputes	  over	  interference	  
with	  national	  security.”152	  
These	  courts	  would	  presumably	  agree	  that	  the	  law	  in	  this	  area	  has	  
“developed	   haphazardly”	   and	   that	   “clarification	   of	   its	   parameters	  
[have]	  not	  been	  adequately	  made.”153	  Yet	  the	  National	  Security	  Agency	  
court	  had	  a	  point,	  whether	  intended	  or	  not,	  in	  using	  the	  word	  “circum-­‐
stances,”	   as	   that	   is	   precisely	  what	   courts	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   ledger	  
have	  done.	  Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  delineate	  with	  precision	  the	  origin,	  
nature,	   and	   extent	   of	   the	   doctrine,	   they	   have	   simply	   listed	   the	   cases	  
previously	  decided,	  described	  what	  they	  concerned,	  slotted	  the	  instant	  
proceeding	  into	  a	  category	  (or	  found	  that	  there	  is	  no	  neat	  fit),	  and	  as-­‐
sumed	   that	   the	   “doctrine”	   is	   limited	   to	   those	   particulars.	   The	   courts	  
have,	  in	  essence,	  neither	  defined	  the	  doctrine	  nor	  set	  its	  parameters.154	  
To	  be	   sure,	   there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  decisions	   that	  were	  argued	   in	  
discrete	  factual	  contexts	  and	  could	  be	  neatly	  categorized	  in	  fairly	  nar-­‐
row	  confines.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  Indian	  cases.	  Courts,	  including	  
the	  Supreme	  Court,	  have	  post-­‐In	  re	  Debs	  held	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  
a	  sovereign	  interest,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  role	  as	  trustee,	  that	  justifies	  bringing	  
suit	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	   Indian	   tribes	  and	   individual	   Indians.155	  Prior	   to	  
the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  and	  the	  adverse	  decisions	  in	  Solomon,	  City	  
of	  Philadelphia,	  and	  Mattson,	  an	  energetic	  Justice	  Department	  brought	  
a	  number	  of	   lawsuits	   in	  southern	  states	  seeking	  desegregation	  of	  bus	  
terminals	  and	  other	  transit	  hubs,	  typically	  under	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  
Commerce	  Clause	  was	  violated.	  The	   claims	  often	   involved	  alternative	  
statutory	   grounds156	   and,	   with	   the	   notable	   exception	   of	   Judge	   Wis-­‐
dom’s	   opinion	   in	   United	   States	   v.	   City	   of	   Jackson,157	   the	   rulings	   con-­‐
tained	   little	   substantive	   discussion.158	   They	   are	   highly	   unlikely,	   for	  
both	  practical	  and	  legal	  reasons,	  to	  be	  brought	  today.	  
	  
	   152.	   	  Id.	  at	  900.	  
	   153.	   	  U.S.	  v.	  Mattson,	  600	  F.2d	  1295,	  1298	  (9th	  Cir.	  1979)	  
	   154.	   	  What	  was	  said	  in	  a	  student	  note	  in	  1979	  remains	  true	  today:	  “neither	  Solomon	  nor	  any	  
other	   case	   denying	   government	   standing	   to	   sue	   has	   proposed	   a	   coherent	   doctrine	   that	   would	  
support	  both	  its	  own	  decision	  and	  principled	  exceptions.	  .	  .”	  YALE	  NOTE,	  supra	  note	  127,	  at	  126.	  	  	  
	   155.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Heckman	  v.	  United	  States,	  224	  U.S.	  413,	  438–41	  (1912);	  United	  States	  v.	  Minne-­‐
sota,	  270	  U.S.	  181,	  194–95	  (1926)	  (“emphasiz[ing]	  the	  duty,	  and	  therefore	  the	  right,	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  to	  sue”);	  Cramer	  v.	  United	  States,	  261	  U.S.	  219,	  233	  (1923).	  See	  generally	  Seth	  Davis,	  Tribal	  
Rights	  of	  Action,	  45	  COLUM.	  HUM.	  RTS.	  L.	  REV.	  499,	  534	  (2014).	  
	   156.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   United	   States	   v.	   City	   of	  Montgomery,	   201	   F.	   Supp.	   590,	   594	   (M.D.	   Ala.	   1960)	  
(Federal	  Aviation	  Act).	  
	   157.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  City	  of	   Jackson,	  318	  F.2d	  1,	  11–17	  (5th	  Cir.	  1963).	  See	  Ledewitz,	  supra	  
note	  138,	  at	  613	  (discussing	  views	  of	  two	  panel	  members	  who	  believed	  the	  suit	  could	  be	  decided	  
solely	  on	  statutory	  grounds).	  	  	  
	   158.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   United	   States	   v.	   City	   of	   Shreveport,	   210	   F.	   Supp.	   36,	   36	   (W.D.	   La.	   1962).	   For	  
discussions	   and	   lists	   of	   these	   cases,	   see	  U.S.	   v.	   City	   of	   Philadelphia,	   644	   F.2d	   187,	   218	   (3d	   Cir.	  
1980)	  (Gibbons,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  (listing	  cases);	  United	  States	  v.	  Solomon,	  563	  F.2d	  1121,	  1128	  (4th	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The	   “national	   security”	   cases	   are	   typified	   by	  United	   States	   v.	   Ar-­‐
lington	  County,159	   in	  which	   the	  Fourth	  Circuit,	   in	   enjoining	   local	   taxa-­‐
tion	  of	   active	  duty	   servicemembers,	  declared	   that	   the	   “interest	  of	   the	  
national	  government	   in	   the	  proper	   implementation	  of	   its	  policies	  and	  
programs	  involving	  the	  national	  defense	  is	  such	  as	  to	  vest	  in	  it	  the	  non-­‐
statutory	  right..	  .	  .”160	  Many	  of	  the	  decisions,	  including	  the	  recent	  one	  in	  
United	   States	   v.	   B.C.	   Enterprises,	   Inc.,161	   involve	   the	   servicemembers’	  
Civil	  Relief	  Act,	  which	  until	  recently	  did	  not	  expressly	  grant	  the	  United	  
States	  (or	  servicemembers,	   for	  that	  matter)	  a	  civil	  right	  of	  action.	  B.C.	  
Enterprises	  is	  significant	  both	  because	  it	  is	  a	  recent	  In	  re	  Debs	  applica-­‐
tion	   and	   because	   the	   Civil	   Rights	   Division	   suggested	   that	   it	   does	   not	  
view	  the	  “categories”	  as	  sacrosanct.	  The	  case	  involved	  a	  company	  that	  
towed	   and	   sold	   absent	   servicemembers’	   vehicles,	   in	   contravention	   of	  
the	  statute.	  The	  Division	  acknowledged	  that	  Solomon	  had	  narrowed	  In	  
re	  Debs’	  application	  in	  the	  Fourth	  Circuit,	  but	  stressed	  that	  its	  claim	  fell	  
squarely	  within	   the	   acknowledged	   national	   security	   category	   and	   ar-­‐
gued	  that	  Arlington	  County	  was	  binding.	  But	  it	  also	  stated,	  in	  its	  brief	  in	  
the	  Fourth	  Circuit,	  that	  “Solomon	  did	  not	  try	  to	  define	  the	  outer	  limits	  
of	   the	  United	   States’	   inherent	   authority	   under	   In	   re	  Debs,”	   but	   rather	  
“define[d]	  several	  categories	  of	  suit	  that	  clearly	  fit	  within	  that	  authori-­‐
	  
Cir.	  1977).	  (same);	  HARVARD	  NOTE,	  supra	  note	  126,	  at	  1572–76;	  Recent	  Development,	  United	  States	  
has	  Nonstatutory	  Standing	  to	  Sue	  to	  Enforce	  Policies	  of	  a	  Federal	  Statute,	  64	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  951,	  953	  
(1964).	  See	  also	  Randolph	  D.	  Moss,	  Note,	  Participation	  and	  Department	  of	  Justice	  School	  Desegre-­‐
gation	  Consent	  Decrees,	  95	  YALE	  L.J.	  1811,	  1824	  n.68	  (1986)	  (effect	  of	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964).	  	  
	   159.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Arlington	  County,	  326	  F.2d	  929	  (4th	  Cir.	  1964).	  
	   160.	   	  Id.	   at	  932–33.	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Marchetti,	   466	  F.2d	  1309,	  1313	  &	  n.3	   (4th	  Cir.	  
1972),	   cert.	   denied,	   409	   U.S.	   1063	   (1972)	   (action	   to	   enjoin	   former	   CIA	   agent	   from	   publishing	  
memoir).	  New	  York	  Times	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States,	  403	  U.S.	  713	  (1971),	  could	  also	  be	  categorized	  as	  a	  
national	   security	   case;	   the	   opinions	   “disclosed	   an	   awareness	   and	   concern	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
government’s	   right	   to	   sue.”	   Solomon,	   563	   F.2d	   at	   1127	   n.5.	   See	   Peter	   D.	   Junger,	  Down	  Memory	  
Lane:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Pentagon	  Papers,	  23	  CASE	  W.	  RES.	  L.	  REV.	  3,	  27-­‐28,	  31	  (1971)	  (decision	  turned	  
on	  assumption	  of	  inherent	  executive	  authority).	  	  	  
	   161.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  B.C.	  Enterprises,	   Inc.,696	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  593	  (E.D.	  Va.	  2010),	  aff’d,	  United	  
States	  v.	  B.C.	  Enterprises,	   Inc.,	  447	  Fed.	  App’x	  468	  (4th	  Cir.	  2011).	  The	  Act	   is	  a	  successor	  to	   the	  
Soldiers’	   and	   Sailors’	   Civil	   Relief	   Act,	   which	  was	   enacted	   following	  World	  War	   I	   and	   has	   been	  
amended	  on	  numerous	  occasions.	  Among	  its	  provisions	  is	  50	  U.S.C.	  App.	  537,	  which	  provides	  that	  
the	  property	  of	  servicemembers	  may	  not	  be	  taken	  and	  sold	  pursuant	  to	  a	  lien	  during	  the	  period	  of	  
active	  duty	  or	  within	  90	  days	  thereafter	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  court	  order.	  The	  United	  States	  filed	  a	  
complaint	  alleging	  that	  the	  defendant	  had	  towed	  and	  sold	  without	  a	  court	  order	  a	  car	  belonging	  to	  
a	  Navy	  lieutenant.	  Afterwards,	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Division	  obtained	  evidence	  that	  the	  defendant	  had	  
also	  sold	  the	  cars	  of	  at	  least	  20	  other	  servicemembers,	  The	  district	  court	  granted	  the	  United	  States	  
summary	   judgment,	   after	   denying	   a	  motion	   filed	   by	   the	   defendant	   regarding	   the	   government’s	  
standing	   and	   absence	   of	   statutory	   authority	   to	   bring	   the	   suit.	   In	   its	   motion,	   the	   United	   States	  
presented	  documentation	  as	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  other	  servicemembers,	  the	  towing	  and	  sale	  of	  
the	  vehicles,	  and	  proof	  of	  damages	  including	  auction	  prices	  and	  appraisal	  values.	  After	  a	  different	  
judge	  in	  the	  same	  district	  held	  that	  there	  is	  no	  implied	  private	  right	  of	  action,	  the	  defendant	  in	  B.C.	  
Enterprises	  filed	  a	  motion	  for	  judgment	  on	  the	  pleadings	  in	  which	  it	  reargued	  the	  proposition	  that	  
the	  United	  States	   is	  bound	  by	  the	  private	   implied	  right	  of	  action	  case	  law.	  The	  district	  court	  de-­‐
nied	  the	  motion	  and	  certified	  its	  order	  for	  interlocutory	  appeal.	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ty.”162	  It	  reasoned	  that	  between	  the	  “two	  points”	  of	  the	  distinct	  catego-­‐
ries	  set	  forth	  in	  Solomon	  and	  that	  of	  giving	  In	  re	  Debs	  “its	  most	  expan-­‐
sive	  possible	  meaning,”163	   lies	   an	  unexplored,	   “murky”	   area.164	  And	   it	  
cited	  Wyandotte	  as	  relying	  on	  In	  re	  Debs	  in	  “assessing	  the	  United	  States’	  
inherent	   authority	   to	   sue.”165	   It	   also	   referenced	  Ruotolo	   v.	   Ruotolo166	  
and	  Mattson,	  two	  oppositional	  cases,	  as	  nonetheless	  generally	  endors-­‐
ing	   the	   “rule”	   that	   the	  United	  States	  has	  expansive	   inherent	  authority	  
to	   sue.167	  Any	  doubt	  as	   to	  whether	   that	  Division	  views	   the	   In	   re	  Debs	  
line	   of	   cases	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   private	   and	   public	   implied	   right	   of	  
cases	  was	  put	  to	  rest	  by	  the	  assertion	  that	  “whether	  the	  United	  States	  
can	  enforce	  a	  statute	  under	  its	  inherent	  authority	  and	  whether	  a	  stat-­‐
ute	  creates	  an	   implied	  private	  cause	  of	  action	  do	  not	   intersect.”168	   In-­‐
deed,	   in	   a	   separate	   proceeding	   in	   the	   same	   district,	   the	   Division	   ap-­‐
appeared	   as	  amicus	   curiae	   to	   support	   a	   serviceman’s	   implied	   private	  
right,	  arguing	  that	  Cort	  was	  applicable.169	  
Then	   there	   are	   the	   outliers,	   the	   decisions	   that	   defy,	   or	   at	   least	  
challenge,	   easy	   classification	   in	   the	   acknowledged/tolerated	   catego-­‐
ries.	   First,	   within	   the	   national	   security	   classification	   itself,	   decisions	  
such	  as	  Arlington	  County	  and	  B.C.	  Enterprises	  are	  arguably	  only	  tangen-­‐
tially	  related	  to	  natural	  security	  “or	  the	  exercise	  of	  military	  powers.”170	  
They	  can	  alternatively	  be	  explained	  as	  furthering,	  through	  an	  inherent	  
litigation	   authority,	   a	   statutory	   objective.171	   And	   in	  which	   category	   is	  
United	  States	  v.	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court,172	  	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  
	  
	   162.	   	  Brief	   of	   the	   United	   States	   as	   Appellee	   at	   8,	   United	   States	   v.	   B.C.	   Enter.,	   Inc.,	   447	   Fed.	  
App’x	  468	  (4th	  Cir.	  2011)	  (No.	  10-­‐1372).	  	  	  
	   163.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Solomon,	  563	  F.2d	  1121,	  1127	  (4th	  Cir.	  1977)..	  
	   164.	   	  Brief	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  Appellee,	  supra	  note	  162,	  at	  14.	  
	   165.	   	  Id.	  at	  9.	  	  
	   166.	   	  Ruotolo	  v.	  Ruotolo,	  572	  F.2d	  336,	  339	  (1st	  Cir.	  1978)	  (no	  right	  of	  action	  to	  seek	  disquali-­‐
fication	  of	  counsel	  for	  bankruptcy	  debtor	  when	  United	  States	  not	  a	  party	  to	  proceeding).	  	  
	   167.	   	  Brief	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	  Appellee,	  supra	  note	  162,	  at	  9.	  
	   168.	   	  Id.	  at	  14.	  “A	  different	  test	  and	  body	  of	  caselaw	  applies.	  .	  .”	  Id.	  at	  15.	  
	   169.	   	  Brief	   for	   the	   United	   States	   as	   Amicus	   Curiae	   in	   Support	   of	   Plaintiff-­‐Appellant	   Urging	  
Reversal,	  Gordon	  v.	  Pete’s	  Auto	  Service	  of	  Denbigh,	  637	  F.3d	  454	  (4th	  Cir.	  2011)	  (No.	  09-­‐2393).	  
The	  defendant	  in	  that	  case	  agreed	  that	  B.C.	  Enterprises	  was	  decided	  under	  a	  different	  theory.	  Brief	  
of	  Appellee,	  Gordon	  v.	  Pete’s	  Auto	  Service	  of	  Denbigh,	  Inc.,	  637	  F.3d	  454	  (4th	  Cir.	  2011)	  (No.	  09-­‐
2393).	  	  	  
	   170.	   	  Note,	   Implied	  Executive	  Authority	   to	  Bring	  Suit	   to	  Enforce	   the	  Rights	  of	   Institutionalized	  
Citizens,	  26	  CATH.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  794,	  799	  n.27	  (1977).	  
	   171.	   	  The	   Solomon	   court,	   after	   identifying	   instances	   in	   which	   it	   had	   permitted	   the	   United	  
States	   to	   seek	   recovery	   of	   improperly	   disbursed	   federal	   funds,	  Wilson	  Clinic	  &	  Hospital,	   Inc.	   v.	  
Blue	  Cross	   of	   South	  Carolina,	   494	  F.2d	  50,	  52	   (4th	  Cir.	   1974),	   and	   to	   enforce	   tax	   immunity	   for	  
national	   defense	   objectives,	  Arlington	   County;	  Marchetti,	   noted	   that	   in	   those	   cases	   “the	   United	  
States	  had	  a	  property	  interest	  to	  be	  protected	  or	  there	  was	  a	  well-­‐defined	  statutory	  interest	  of	  the	  
public	  at	  large	  to	  be	  protected.”	  563	  F.2d	  at	  1127	  (emphasis	  added).	  
	   172.	   	  United	  States	  v.	  Colorado	  Supreme	  Court,	  87	  F.3d	  1161,	  1165-­‐66	  (10th	  Cir.	  1996).	  
512	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  
successfully	  challenged	  the	  State	  of	  Colorado	  regarding	  the	  application	  
of	  a	  professional	  ethics	  rule	  to	  federal	  prosecutors.	  Or	  Commonwealth	  
of	  Pennsylvania	  v.	  Porter,173	  which	  post-­‐City	  of	  Philadelphia	  relied	  on	  In	  
re	  Debs	   for	  its	  finding	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  parens	  patriae	  stand-­‐
ing	  to	  remedy	  civil	  rights	  violations	  and	  that	  “federal	  sovereign	   inter-­‐
ests	  support	  the	  settled	  standing	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  bring”	  actions	  
seeking	   injunctive	   relief.174	   Or	   Brennan	   v.	   Buckeye	   Industries,	   Inc.,175	  
involving	  a	  non-­‐statutorily	  authorized	  injunction	  to	  secure	  a	  workplace	  
inspection.	  These	  decisions,	  and	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Division’s	  brief	  in	  B.C.	  
Enterprises,	   suggest	   two	   things.	  The	  categories	  are	  not,	   at	   least	   in	   the	  
view	  of	  that	  Division,	  a	  complete	  recitation	  of	  the	  government’s	  inher-­‐
ent	  authority,	  and	  there	  are	   instances,	  albeit	   few	  in	  number,	   in	  which	  
the	   government	   does	   in	   fact	   assert	   In	   re	   Debs’	   applicability	   in	   non-­‐
traditional	  contexts	  and	  meets	  with	  judicial	  approval.	  Indeed,	  the	  gov-­‐
ernment	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  apply	  In	  re	  Debs	   in	  both	  the	  national	  security	  
and	  civil	  rights/Commerce	  Clause	  arenas	  until	  the	  1960s,	  in	  ways	  that	  
must	   have	   seemed	  non-­‐traditional	   to	   both	   courts	   and	   Justice	  Depart-­‐
ment	  lawyers	  at	  the	  time.176	  
Given	   the	  waning	   strength	   of	  Wyandotte	   as	   support	   for	   such	   ac-­‐
tions,	  it	  would	  be	  surprising	  if	  the	  Civil	  Division	  ignored	  In	  re	  Debs	  and	  
its	  progeny	  in	  future	  lawsuits	  seeking	  recovery	  for	  damage	  to	  govern-­‐
ment	   property	   or	   the	   recovery	   of	   costs.	   Moreover,	   and	  more	   signifi-­‐
cantly	   for	   potential	   patent	   actions,	   the	   Department	   seems	   highly	  
reluctant	   to	   voluntarily	   straightjacket	   the	   doctrine	   by	   acquiescing	   to	  
narrow	  categories	  when	   In	   re	  Debs	   speaks	  of	  broad	  authority.	  Courts	  
are	   unlikely	   to	   find	   that	   the	   “mere	   incantation	   of	   ‘sovereign	   inter-­‐
ests’”177	  is	  sufficient,	  but	  between	  that	  extreme	  and	  cramped	  tradition-­‐
al	   categories	   lies	   the	   “murky”	   area	   that,	   in	   a	   post-­‐Wyandotte	   era,	   the	  
United	  States	  may	  increasingly	  need	  to	  explore.	  
	  
	   173.	   	  Commonwealth	  of	  Pennsylvania	  v.	  Porter,	  659	  F.2d	  306	  (3d	  Cir.	  1981)	  (en	  banc).	  
	   174.	   	  Id.	  at	  316.	  
	   175.	   	  Brennan	  v.	  Buckeye	  Industries,	  Inc.,	  374	  F.	  Supp.	  1350,	  1353	  (S.D.	  Ga.	  1974).	  
	   176.	   	  The	  Justice	  Department’s	  tactical	  approach	  and	  decision	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  applicability	  of	  
In	  re	  Debs	  are	  described	  in	  Steven	  J.	  Pollak	  et	  al.,	  Civil	  Rights	  Division	  Association	  Symposium:	  The	  
Civil	  Rights	  Division,	  30	  MCGEORGE	  L.	  REV.	  957,	  964-­‐66	  (1999).	  
	   177.	   	  In	  re	  National	  Sec.	  Agency	  Telecommunications	  Records	  Litigation,	  633	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  892,	  
901	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  2007).	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III.	  PROCEDURAL	  AND	  TACTICAL	  CONSIDERATIONS	  AND	  IMPACTS	  
A.	  Subject	  Matter	  Jurisdiction	  and	  Standing	  Would	  Not	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Problematic	  
If	   a	   cause	   of	   action	   exists,	   the	   United	   States	   through	   the	   Justice	  
Department	  will	  have	   standing	   to	  pursue	   it,	   and	   subject	  matter	   juris-­‐
diction	  for	  either	  an	  implied	  or	  inherent	  non-­‐statutory	  action	  in	  which	  
the	  United	  States	   is	  a	  plaintiff	   is	  provided	  by	  statute.	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1345	  
(2012)	   grants	   federal	   district	   courts	   “original	   jurisdiction	   of	   all	   civil	  
actions,	   suits	   or	   proceedings	   commenced	   by	   the	   United	   States,	   or	   by	  
any	   agency	   or	   officer	   thereof	   expressly	   authorized	   to	   sue	   by	   Act	   or	  
Congress.”178	  Standing	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  are	  sepa-­‐
rate	  concepts,	  even	  though	  courts	  (including	  in	  the	  implied	  and	  inher-­‐
ent	  cases)	  often	  conflate	   the	   two,	  as	  do	  some	  commentators.179	  While	  
the	  catchphrase,	  “without	  more,	  	  a	  federal	  interest	  based	  solely	  on	  sov-­‐
ereignty	   is	   likely	   insufficient	   to	   justify	   a	   cause	   of	   action,	   “	   should	   be	  
given	  credence,	   courts	  have	  made	  clear	   that,	   in	  essence,	   the	  mere	  ar-­‐
ticulation	   of	   a	   public	   interest	   in	   a	   case	   brought	   by	   the	   United	   States	  
suffices	   to	   demonstrate	   standing.180	   Accordingly,	   when	   courts	   have	  
rejected	   implied	  or	   inherent	  claims	  by	   the	  United	  States,181	   they	  have	  
	  
	   178.	   	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  interpreted	  Section	  1345	  to	  provide	  for	  subject	  matter	  jurisdic-­‐
tion	   if	   the	   litigation	   is	   commenced	   by	   a	   federal	   party,	   the	  United	   States	   or	   agency	   plaintiff	   has	  
standing	  to	  sue,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  statutory	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  grant	  of	  jurisdiction.	  Fed.	  Sav.	  &	  
Loan	   Ins.	   Co.	   v.	   Ticktin,	   490	  U.S.	   82,	   85	   (1989).	   Thus,	   the	   inquiry	   is	   dependent,	   in	   part,	   on	   the	  
outcome	   of	   the	   standing	   analysis.	   Standing	   should	   not,	   however,	   prove	   an	   obstacle	   here,	   and	  
while	  there	  is	  a	  sound	  argument	  that	  no	  separate	  inquiry	  into	  the	  United	  States’	  standing	  is	  either	  
necessary	  or	  proper,	  because	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  patentee	  as	  a	  plaintiff,	  it	  ought	  not	  be	  neces-­‐
sary	  for	  the	  Justice	  Department	  to	  further	  contend	  that	  private	  standing	  rules	  are	  inapplicable.	  	  	  
	   179.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  In	  re	  Debs,	  158	  U.S.	  564,	  582	  (1895);	  Sanitary	  Dist.	  of	  Chi.	  v.	  United	  States,	  266	  
U.S.	  405,	  426	  (1925);	  YALE	  NOTE,	  supra	  note	  127,	  at	  118;	  Recent	  Development,	  supra	  note	  158,	  at	  
951.	  
	   180.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Vt.	   Agency	   of	  Natural	   Res.	   v.	   United	   States	   ex	   rel.	   Stevens,	   529	  U.S.	   765,	   771	  
(2000);	  FTC	  v.	  Dean	  Foods	  Co.,	  384	  U.S.	  597,	  606	  (1966);	  United	  States	  v.	  Arlington	  County,	  326	  
F.2d	  929,	  931	  (4th	  Cir.	  1964).;	  See	  generally	  Tara	  Leigh	  Grove,	  Standing	  Outside	  of	  Article	  III,	  162	  
U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  1311,	  1326	  (2014).	  	  
	   181.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	  U.S.	  v.	  City	  of	  Philadelphia,	  644	  F.2d	  187	  (3d	  Cir.	  1980);	  U.S.	  v.;	  Solomon,	  563	  
F.2d	  1121	  (4th	  Cir.	  1977);	  U.S.	  v.	  Mattson,	  600	  F.2d	  1295	  (9th	  Cir.	  1979)..	  Doubters	  might	  argue	  
that	  because	  San	  Jacinto	  Tin	  stated	  that	  “if	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  suit	  is	  brought	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  
some	   third	   party”	   the	  United	   States	   lacks	   standing	   absent	   a	   pecuniary	   interest	   or	   obligation,	   it	  
may	   not	   sue	   to	   enforce	   a	   private	   patent.	   U.S.	   v.	   San	   Jacinto	   Tin	   Co.,	   125	   U.S.	   273,	   286	   (1888).	  
Likewise,	   the	   Court	   in	   In	   re	   Debs,	   without	   elaboration,	   stated	   that	   the	   government	   should	   not	  
“interfere	   in	   any	  mere	  matter	   of	   private	   controversy.”	   In	   re	   Debs,	   158	  U.S,	   at	   586.	   But	   the	   San	  
Jacinto	  Tin	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  standing	  even	  though	  there	  was	  an	  identified	  
non-­‐party	  that	  would	  likely	  obtain	  the	  land	  patent	  if	  the	  claim	  for	  nullification	  succeeded.	  125	  U.S.	  
at	  287.	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  a	  beneficiary	  was	  not	  disqualifying,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  government	  had	  
an	  independent	  interest	  in	  bringing	  the	  litigation.	  Similarly,	  the	  court	  in	  B.C.	  Enterprises	  vocalized	  
no	  standing	  concerns	  even	  though	  the	  United	  States	  was	  seeking	  damages	   for	  particular	  absent	  
servicemembers.	  U.S.	  v.	  B.C.	  Enters	  Inc.,	  696	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  593	  (E.D.	  Va.	  2010).	  In	  a	  patent	  case,	  the	  
United	  States	  would	  not	  be	  pursuing	  the	  lawsuit	  solely	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  benefitting	  the	  patentee,	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impliedly	   done	   so	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   no	   right	   of	   action	   exists,	   not	   be-­‐
cause	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  standing.182	  
B.	  Much	  About	  the	  Conduct	  of	  Litigation	  Would	  Not	  Change	  
The	  presence	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  through	  the	  Justice	  Department,	  
as	  a	  plaintiff	  in	  a	  private	  patent	  case	  would	  present	  several	  case	  man-­‐
agement	  issues.	  The	  determinations	  made	  by	  the	  Civil	  Division	  on	  the-­‐
se	  questions	  could	  affect	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  patentees	  view	  the	  United	  
States	  as	  a	  desirable	  co-­‐plaintiff.	  For	  example,	  presumably	  one	  benefit	  
to	  patentees	  could	  be	  that	  patent	  examiners	  might	  be	  more	  frequently	  
made	  available	  to	  testify,	  or	  perhaps	  required	  to	  do	  so	  by	  courts.	  Dur-­‐
ing	  claim	  construction,	  the	  United	  States	  could	  seek	  to	  present	  examin-­‐
	  
but	  rather	  to	  advance	  its	  own	  sovereign	  interest	  in	  promoting	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  patent	  system.	  
Likewise,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  not	  be	  standing	  in	  the	  shoes	  of	  the	  patentee,	  who	  would	  be	  a	  
co-­‐plaintiff.	   	   Therefore,	   even	   though	   the	   patentee	   would	   benefit	   by	   a	   successful	   action,	   there	  
should	  be	  no	  third-­‐party	  standing	  concern.	  
	   182.	   	  As	  an	  alternative	  to	  filing	  a	  complaint	  with	  the	  patentee,	  e.g.,	   in	   instances	   in	  which	  the	  
United	   States	   either	   independently	   determines	   to	   participate	   in	   an	   existing	   suit	   (either	   to	   fully	  
support	  the	  patentee’s	  case	  or	  to	  present	  a	  different	  claim	  construction	  or	  merits	  argument)	  or	  is	  
courted	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  Justice	  Department	  could	  seek	  to	  intervene.	  A	  possible,	  but	  slight,	  advantage	  
could	  be	  strategic	  filing	  in	  light	  of	  a	  circuit	  split	  concerning	  whether	  a	  proposed	  intervenor	  as	  of	  
right	  must	  demonstrate	  Article	  III	  standing.	  See	  San	  Juan	  County	  v.	  United	  States,	  420	  F.3d	  1197,	  
1204-­‐05	   (10th	   Cir.	   2005)	   (describing	   circuit	   split),	   rev’d	   on	   other	   grounds,	   San	   Juan	   County	   v.	  
United	  States,	  503	  F.3d	  1163,	  1167	  (10th	  Cir.	  2007).	  The	  Federal	  Circuit	  has	  apparently	  not	  ad-­‐
dressed	  the	  issue.	  To	  intervene	  as	  of	  right	  under	  Rule	  24(a),	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  obligated	  
to	  show	  (1)	  it	  has	  an	  interest,	  (2)	  disposition	  of	  the	  case	  without	  intervention,	  would,	  as	  a	  practi-­‐
cal	   matter,	   impair	   or	   impede	   its	   interest,	   (3)	   the	   interest	   is	   inadequately	   represented	   by	   the	  
patentee,	  and	  (4)	  the	  motion	  is	  timely	  made.	  See	  Ewers	  v.	  Heron,	  419	  F.3d	  1,	  3	  (1st	  Cir.	  2005).	  The	  
interest	  need	  not	  be	  the	  same	  as	   the	  patentee’s.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Solid	  Waste	  Agency	  of	  N.	  Cook	  Cnty	  v.	  
U.S.	  Army	  Corps,	  101	  F.3d	  503,	  506	   (7th	  Cir.	  1996).	  Courts	   routinely	  accept	   statements	  of	   gov-­‐
ernment	   interest	   that	   are	   broader	   than	   the	   concerns	   of	   a	   private	   party.	  See,	   e.g.,	   Sierra	   Club	   v.	  
Robertson,	   960	   F.2d	   83,	   86	   (8th	   Cir.	   1992)	   (recognizing	   the	   scope	   of	   government	   interest	   is	  
broader	  than	  that	  of	  a	  private	  party);	  Smith	  v.	  Pangilinan,	  651	  F.2d	  1320,	  1324–25	  (9th	  Cir.	  1981)	  
(allowing	  the	  Attorney	  General	  to	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  U.S.	  due	  to	  the	  protected	  interest	  in	  
an	  action	  concerning	  citizenship).	  For	  example,	  in	  Heaton	  v.	  Monogram	  Credit	  Card	  Bank,	  297	  F.3d	  
416	   (5th	   Cir.	   2002),	   the	   court	   noted	   the	   FDIC’s	   “broader	   interest	   in	   protecting	   the	   proper	   and	  
consistent	  application	  of	  the	  Congressionally	  designed	  framework	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  and	  integ-­‐
rity	  of	  the	  federal	  deposit	  insurance	  system.”	  Id.	  at	  424.	  It	  observed	  that	  “[g]overnment	  agencies	  
such	  as	  the	  FDIC	  must	  represent	  the	  public	  interest,	  not	  just	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  one	  indus-­‐
try.”	  Id.	  at	  425.	  Some	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  the	  interest	  prong	  does	  not	  mandate	  demonstration	  of	  
a	  right	  to	  sue.	  See,	  e.g.,	  U.S.	  v.	  Philip	  Morris	  USA,	  Inc.,	  566	  F.3d	  1095,	  1145	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  2009)	  (“inter-­‐
vention	  of	  right	  only	  requires	  ‘an	  interest’	  in	  the	  litigation—-­‐not	  a	  ‘cause	  of	  action’	  or	  ‘permission	  
to	  sue.’”	  (citation	  omitted));	  Flying	  J,	  Inc.	  v.	  J.B.	  Van	  Hollen,	  578	  F.3d	  569,	  571–-­‐72	  (7th	  Cir.	  2008).),	  
but	   others	   disagree.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Sokaogon	   Chippewa	   Cmty.	   v.	   Babbit,	   214	   F.3d	   941,	   946	   (7th	   Cir.	  
2000);	  Heyman	   v.	  Exchange	  Nat’l	   Bank	   of	   Chi.,	   615	   F.2d	   1190,	   1193	   (7th	   Cir.	   1980);	   Diaz	   v.	   S.	  
Drilling	   Corp.,	   427	   F.2d	   1118,	   1124	   (5th	   Cir.	   1970).	   See	   generally	   Justin	   P.	   Gunter,	   Note,	  Dual	  
Standards	   for	  Third-­‐Party	   Intervenors:	  Distinguishing	  Between	  Public-­‐Law	  and	  Private-­‐Law	   Inter-­‐
vention,	  66	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  645,	  664–-­‐67	  (2013)	  (surveying	  different	  approaches	   to	   the	  sufficient-­‐
interest	   requirement).	   Once	   the	   court	   accepts	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   interest	   or	   cause	   of	   action,	   it	  
should	  readily	  find	  that	  the	  third	  prong	  is	  satisfied.	  And	  courts	  have	  little	  difficulty	  understanding	  
that	   intervenor	   status	   conveys	   advantages	   over	   amicus	   participation.	   Timeliness,	   in	   a	   private	  
patent	  case,	  presents	  no	  unique	  issues.	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er	  testimony	  to	  explain	  a	  reference,183	  an	  isolated	  statement,184	  a	  cryp-­‐
tic	  remark,185	  or	  an	  ambiguity186	  in	  the	  prosecution	  history,	  particular-­‐
ly	   if	   an	   issue	   of	   disclaimer187	   arises,	   and	   could	   therefore	   provide	   a	  
justification	   for	   courts	   to	   give	   increased	  weight	   to	   prosecution	   histo-­‐
ry.188	  At	  present,	   in	   light	  of	   judicial	  determinations	  that	  examiners,	  as	  
quasi-­‐judicial	   officers,189	   should	   not	   be	   subject	   to	   deposition	   or	   re-­‐
quired	   to	   give	   to	   give	   testimony	   regarding	   their	   mental	   processes,	  
analyses,	  or	  conclusions,190	  examiner	  depositions	  are	  rarely	  sought	   in	  
infringement	   cases.191	   The	   PTO’s	  Manual	   of	   Patent	   Examining	   Proce-­‐
dure	  relies	  in	  part	  upon	  those	  rulings	  in	  stating	  that	  examiners	  should	  
“refuse	  to	  express	  to	  any	  person	  any	  opinion	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  or	  inva-­‐
lidity	  of”	  a	  patent.192	  The	  regulation	  that	  the	  PTO	  adheres	  to	  concerns	  
both	  expert	  and	  opinion	  testimony	  by	  government	  employees	  but	  ad-­‐
dresses	   cases	   in	  which	   the	  United	  States	   is	   a	  party	  only	  by	  providing	  
that	  “an	  employee	  [of	  the	  United	  States]	  may	  not	  testify	  as	  an	  expert	  or	  
	  
	   183.	   	  	  See	  Ecolab,	  Inc.	  v.	  FMC	  Corp.,	  569	  F.3d	  1335,	  1343	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2009)	  (discussing	  weight	  to	  
be	  placed	  on	  statements	  by	  an	  examiner).	  	  
	   184.	   	  	  See	   Elbex	   Video,	   Ltd.	   v.	   Sensormatic	   Elecs.	   Corp.,	   508	   F.3d	   1366,	   1371-­‐72	   (Fed.	   Cir.	  
2007)	   (finding	   that	   particular	   statement	   did	   not	   result	   in	   a	   disclaimer	   where	   they	   “did	   not	  
amount	  to	  a	  clear	  and	  unmistakable	  surrender	  of	  claim	  scope”).	  
	   185.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Blackboard,	   Inc.	   v.	   Desire2Learn,	   Inc.,	   574	   F.3d	   1371,	   1377	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   2009)	  
(having	  access	  only	   to	   the	  prosecution	  history,	   the	  court	  placed	  no	  emphasis	  on	   the	  examiner’s	  
“cryptic	  remarks”	  in	  interview	  summaries).	  	  
	   186.	   	  The	   Federal	   Circuit	   has	   noted	   that	   prosecution	   history,	   because	   it	   reflects	   an	   ongoing	  
negotiation	   process,	   is	   often	   less	   helpful	   than	   the	   written	   specifications	   and	   therefore	   of	   less	  
utility	  during	  claim	  construction.	  Phillips	  v.	  AWH	  Corp.,	  415	  F.3d	  1303,	  1317	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2005)	  (en	  
banc).	  
	   187.	   	  See	  Omega	  Eng’g,	  Inc.	  v.	  Raytek	  Corp.,	  334	  F.3d	  1314,	  1323–26	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2003).	  
	   188.	   	  See	   Greg	   Reilly,	   Judicial	   Capacities	   and	   Patent	   Claim	   Construction:	   An	   Ordinary	   Reader	  
Standard,	  20	  MICH.	  TELECOMM.	  &	  TECH.	  L.	  REV.	  243,	  259	  (2014)	  (“Phillips	  held	  that	  a	  court	  should	  
consider	  a	  patent’s	  prosecution	  history	   if	   it	   is	   in	  evidence.”);	   Jonas	  Anderson	  &	  Peter	  S.	  Menell,	  
Informal	  Deference:	  A	  Historical,	  Empirical,	  and	  Normative	  Analysis	  of	  Patent	  Claim	  Construction,	  
108	  NW.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  45	  (2013)	  (discussing	  how	  the	  Federal	  Circuit’s	  ruling	  in	  Phillips	  has	  impact-­‐
ed	  utilization	  of	  prosecution	  history).	  
	   189.	   	  U.S.	  v.	  Am.	  Bell	  Tel.	  Co.,	  128	  U.S.	  315,	  363	  (1888)	  (“The	  patent	  .	  .	  .	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  course	  
of	  proceeding	  quasi	  judicial	  in	  its	  character	  .	  .	  .	  .”);	  Butterworth	  v.	  U.S.	  ex	  rel.	  Hoe,	  112	  U.S.	  50,	  67	  
(1884).	  	  
	   190.	   	  See	  U.S.	  v.	  Morgan,	  313	  U.S.	  409,	  422	  (1941)	  (holding	  that	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Agriculture,	  
as	  an	  administrative	  agent,	   should	  not	  be	  subjected	   to	  depositions	  resembling	   judicial	  proceed-­‐
ings);	  Western	  Elec.	  Co.	   v.	  Piezo	  Tech.,	   Inc.,	  860	  F.2d	  428,	  432–33	   (Fed.	  Cir.	  1988)	   (disallowing	  
questions	  posed	  to	  examiner	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  including	  the	  concern	  that	  “(t)hey	  tend	  to	  
be	  disruptive	  of	  the	  decisionmaking	  process	  and	  thereby	  interfere	  with	  the	  PTO’s	  administrative	  
functions”);	  In	  re	  Nilssen,	  851	  F.2d	  1401,	  1402	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1988)	  (“The	  technical	  background	  and	  
other	   professional	   qualifications	   of	   the	   particular	   Examiners-­‐in-­‐Chief	   [of	   the	   Patent	   Trial	   and	  
Appeal	  Board]	  are	  not	  legally	  relevant	  in	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  board	  .	  .	  .	  .”)	  
	   191.	   	  Laurence	  H.	  Pretty,	  Where	  the	  Veil	  Against	  Discovery	  in	  Patent	  Litigation	  Falls,	  76	  J.	  PAT.	  &	  
TRADEMARK	  OFF.	  SOC’Y	  71,	  71–86	  (1994).	  	  
	   192.	   	  U.S.	  PAT.	  &	  TRADEMARK	  OFFICE,	  MANUAL	  OF	  PAT.	  EXAMINING	  PROC.	  §	  1701	  (9th	  ed.	  2014).	  See	  
Edward	   D.	   Manzo,	  How	   to	   Improve	   Patent	   Claim	   Interpretations,	   22	   FED.	   CIRCUIT	   B.J.	   203,	   208	  
(2012)	  (“[t]hough	  their	  testimony	  would	  be	  helpful,	  patent	  examiners	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  testify	  
on	  their	  mental	  processes	  or	  various	  other	  issues”).	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opinion	  witness	  for	  any	  party	  other	  than	  the	  United	  States.”193	  Yet	  the	  
concern	   that	   subjecting	   examiners	   to	   questioning	   interferes	  with	   the	  
PTO’s	   administrative	   functions194	   has	   equal	   force	   when	   the	   United	  
States	   is	   seeking	   to	   enforce	   a	   private	   patent.	   Moreover,	   questioning	  
examiners	  on	  mental	  processes	   in	  evaluating	  applications	  or	  with	   re-­‐
gard	   to	   validity	   is	   inconsistent	  with	   the	   statutory	  presumption	  of	  pa-­‐
tent	   validity	   and	   the	   presumption	   that	   the	   examiner	   has	   properly	  
exercised	  her	  duties.195	  Accordingly,	   the	  PTO	  should	  take	  the	  position	  
that	   it	  will	   not	   authorize	   examiners	   to	   testify	   in	   a	   private	   patent	   en-­‐
forcement	  case	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  is	  a	  plaintiff,	  except	  as	  pro-­‐
vided	  in	  its	  procedures	  manual,196	  and	  the	  Civil	  Division	  should	  object	  
to	  subpoenas	  issued	  to	  examiners	  when	  the	  procedures	  for	  requesting	  
testimony	  are	  not	  complied	  with	  or	  when	  the	  PTO	  General	  Counsel	  has	  
determined	  that	  the	  examiner	  should	  not	  testify	  or	  may	  testify	  only	  on	  
specified	  matters.	  PTO	  attorneys	  should	  participate	  in	  any	  depositions	  
or	  trial	  proceedings	  in	  which	  an	  examiner	  is	  testifying	  in	  order	  to	  lodge	  
appropriate	  objections.197	  
Other	  procedural	  and	  litigation	  participation	  issues198	  concern	  the	  
prevalence	  of	  patent	   fraud,199	   the	  ability	  of	   third	  parties	   to	  seek	  post-­‐
grant200	   and	   inter	   partes	   review201	   by	   the	   Patent	   Trial	   and	   Appeal	  
	  
	   193.	   	  37	  C.F.R.	  §	  104.23(d)	  (2014).	  	  	  
	   194.	   	  Western	  Elec.	  Co.,	  860	  F.2d	  at	  432–33.	  	  
	   195.	   	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  282	  (2012).	  See	  Microsoft	  Corp.	  v.	  i4i	  Ltd.	  P’ship,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2238,	  2243	  (2011)	  
(describing	   the	   origin	   and	   significance	   of	   the	   presumption	   of	   validity).	   Likewise,	   courts	   should	  
continue	  to	  reject	  any	  testimony	  regarding	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  examiner,	  or	  how	  much	  time	  she	  
spent	   on	   the	   application.	  See,	   e.g,	   Am.	  Hoist	  &	  Derrick	  Co.	   v.	   Sowa	  &	  Sons,	   Inc.,	   725	  F.2d	  1350,	  
1359	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1984).	  	  	  
	   196.	   	  While	   the	   PTO	   has	   statutory	   authority	   to	   issue	   procedural	   rules	   under	   35	   U.S.C.	   §	  
2(b)(2)(A)	  (2012),	  no	  new	  rule	  or	  revision	  to	  the	  procedures	  manual	  is	  necessary.	  	  
	   197.	   	  If	  the	  PTO	  has	  a	  disagreement	  with	  the	  Civil	  Division	  regarding	  this	  matter	  or	  otherwise,	  
it	  would	  not	  set	  forth	  a	  competing	  position	  in	  the	  litigation,	  but	  rather	  would	  resolve	  the	  dispute	  
within	   the	   Executive	   Branch	   by	   submitting	   the	   issue	   to	   the	   Attorney	   General.	   See	   Exec.	   Order	  
12,146,	  44	  Fed.	  Reg.	  42,657	  (July	  20,	  1979).	  Even	  agencies	  with	  independent	  litigating	  authority	  
must	  submit	  disputes	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Executive	  Order.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Tenn.	  Valley	  Auth.	  v.	  U.S.,	  13	  Cl.	  Ct.	  
692,	   702	   (Cl.	   Ct.	   1987).	   The	   existence	   of	   a	   disagreement	   would	   not	   justify	   a	   refusal	   to	   accord	  
privilege	  protection	  to	  communications	  between	  Civil	  and	  the	  PTO,	  or	  between	  Civil	  and	  another	  
Division	  within	  DOJ.	  See,	  e.g.,	  U.S.	  v.	  Jicarilla	  Apache	  Nation,	  131	  S.	  Ct.	  2313,	  2321	  (2011)	  (holding	  
that	   attorney-­‐client	   privilege	   protects	   communications	   between	   government	   officials	   and	   gov-­‐
ernment	  attorneys).	  	  
	   198.	   	  This	  discussion	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  exclusive.	  	  
	   199.	   	  See	  Walker	  Process	  Equip.,	   Inc.	  v.	  Food	  Mach.	  &	  Chem.	  Corp.,	  382	  U.S.	  172,	  174	  (1965)	  
(finding	  that	  patent	  fraud	  may	  violate	  the	  Sherman	  Act);	  Handgards,	  Inc.	  v.	  Ethicon,	  Inc.,	  601	  F.2d	  
986,	  993	  (9th	  Cir.	  1979).	  See	  generally	  Christopher	  R.	  Leslie,	  Monopolization	  Through	  Patent	  Theft,	  
103	  GEO.	   L.J.	   47,	   48–50	   (2014)	   (identifying	  prevalence	   of	   patent	   theft	   in	  many	   fields)	  R.	   Leslie,	  
Antitrust,	  Inequitable	  Conduct,	  and	  the	  Intent	  to	  Deceive	  the	  Patent	  Office,	  1	  UC	  IRVINE	  L.	  REV.	  323,	  
325	  (2011)	  (discussing	  the	  impact	  of	  invalid	  patents	  on	  competition).	  	  
	   200.	   	  35	  U.S.C.	  §§	  321–29	  (2012).	  
	   201.	   	  Id.	  at	  §§	  311–-­‐19.	  	  
2015]	   PATENT	  INFRINGEMENT	  LITIGATION	   517	  
Board,	   patentee	   requests	   for	   reconsideration202	   and	   PTO	   reexamina-­‐
tions,203	   and	   antitrust	   and	   settlement	   concerns.	   If	   a	   third-­‐party-­‐
initiated	   review,	   reconsideration,	   or	   reexamination	   is	   ongoing	   at	   the	  
time	  a	  patentee	  requests	   that	   the	  Civil	  Division	   join	   in	  a	  complaint	  or	  
seek	  to	  intervene,	  no	  action	  should	  be	  undertaken	  until	  the	  conclusion	  
of	  the	  PTO	  or	  Board	  process,	  through	  the	  issuance	  of	  written	  findings	  
or	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   appeals,	   as	   appropriate,.	   Similarly,	   for	   infringe-­‐
ment	  cases,	  the	  Division	  should	  support	  a	  stay,	  including	  of	  discovery,	  
pending	   the	   outcome	   of	   any	   reexamination	   or	   reissuance	   proceeding	  
involving	   the	  patent	  at	   issue	   (and	  should	  do	  so	  even	   if	   such	  proceed-­‐
ings	  did	  not	  routinely	  result	  in	  invalidation	  or	  modification	  of	  the	  orig-­‐
inal	  patent).204	  The	  United	  States	  should	  also	  uniformly	  agree	  to	  litiga-­‐
litigation	  stays	  if	  third-­‐party	  review	  is	  initiated	  during	  the	  pendency	  of	  
a	  case	  it	  has	  joined.	  Although	  the	  presumption	  of	  validity	  still	  attaches	  
until	  the	  PTO	  determination,	  stays	  often	  result	  in	  simplifying	  the	  issues	  
to	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   court,	   and	   a	   stay	   recognizes	   the	   integrity	   of	  
the	   PTO	   process.205	   Further,	   the	   Civil	   Division	   should,	   before	   filing	   a	  
complaint	   or	   intervening,	   consult	  with	   the	   PTO	   to	   ascertain	  whether	  
there	   is	   any	   evidence	   of	   patent	   fraud,206	   and	   refer	   such	   cases	   to	   the	  
Criminal	   Division.	   But	   because	   of	   the	   presumption	   of	   validity,	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  such	  evidence	  there	  need	  be	  no	   independent	   investigation	  
of	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   patent	   prior	   to	   bringing,	   or	   intervening	   in,	   an	  
infringement	  claim.207	  If	  the	  patentee	  proposes	  a	  settlement	  involving	  a	  
	  
	   202.	   	  Id.	  §	  257(a).	  	  
	   203.	   	  Id.	  §	  257(b).	  	  
	   204.	   	  Courts	  have	  recognized	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  reexamination	  and	  reissuance	  processes.	  See,	  
e.g.,	  MercExchange,	  L.L.C.	  v.	  eBay,	  Inc.,	  500	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  556,	  563–64	  (E.D.	  Va.	  2007);	  In	  re	  Cygnus	  
Telecomms.	  Tech.,	  LLC,	  Patent	  Litig.,	  385	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1022,	  1023	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  2005).	  A	  stay	  is	  appro-­‐
priate	   because	   a	   reexamination	   is	   “probative	   to	   the	   issue	   of	  whether	   defendants	   have	   raised	   a	  
substantial	  question	  of	  validity.”	  Pergo,	  Inc.	  v.	  Faus	  Group,	  Inc.,	  401	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  515,	  524	  (E.D.N.C.	  
2005).	  	  	  
	   205.	   	  Courts	  have	  discretion	  on	  this	  issue.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Viskase	  Corp.	  v.	  Am.	  Nat’l	  Can	  Co.,	  261	  F.3d	  
1316,	   1328	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   2001).	   The	   exception	   would	   be	   a	   requested	   stay	   that	   would	   impose	   an	  
obligation	  upon	  the	  PTO.	  Such	  requests	  should	  be	  opposed	  as	  inappropriate	  under	  Federal	  Circuit	  
precedent.	  See	  Emerson	  Elec.	  Co.	  v.	  Davoil,	  Inc.,	  88	  F.3d	  1051,	  1054	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  1996).	  	  	  
	   206.	   	  The	  PTO	  Director	  has	  an	  affirmative	  obligation	  to	  report	  any	  known	  evidence	  of	  a	  mate-­‐
rial	   fraud	   in	   connection	   with	   a	   patent	   subject	   to	   a	   supplemental	   examination	   by	   the	   Attorney	  
General..	  35	  U.S.C.	  §	  257(e)	  (2012).	  See	   J.	  Thomas	  Rosch,	  Patent	  Law	  and	  Antitrust	  Law:	  Neither	  
Friend	  Nor	  Foe,	  But	  Business	  Partners,	  13	  SEDONA	  CONF.	  J.	  95,	  98	  (2012).	  	  
	   207.	   	  See	   Q-­‐Pharma,	   Inc.	   v.	   Andrew	   Jergens	   Co.,	   360	   F.3d	   1295,	   1303	   (Fed.	   Cir.	   2004).	   Of	  
course,	   to	   satisfy	   professional	   ethical	   obligations,	   the	   Division	   should	   examine	   evidence	   of	   in-­‐
fringement	   obtained	   by	   the	   patentee	   or	   by	   government	   personnel,	   in	   accordance	  with	  Rule	   11	  
and	   judicial	   interpretations	   of	   the	   Rule,	   to	   determine	   independently	   that	   there	   is	   a	   good	   faith	  
basis	   for	   the	   suit.	   This	   is	   the	   same	   standard	   that	   is	   applicable	   to	   the	   patentee.	  See,	   e.g.,	   Source	  
Vagabond	  Sys.	  Ltd.	  v.	  Hydrapak,	  Inc.,	  753	  F.3d	  1291,	  1298	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2014)	  (stating	  that	  Rule	  11(b)	  
requires	  a	  reasonable	   inquiry	   that	   the	   legal	  contentions	  are	  warranted	  by	  existing	   law	  and	  that	  
the	  factual	  contentions	  have	  evidentiary	  support).	  Relatedly,	  and	  again	  operating	  on	  the	  statutory	  
presumption,	   the	   United	   States	   should	   oppose	   counterclaims	   for	   declaratory	   judgment	   as	   to	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licensing	  arrangement,	  the	  Civil	  Division	  should	  consult	  with	  the	  Anti-­‐
trust	  Division	  and	   the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	   (FTC)	   to	  determine	  
whether	  there	  are	  monopolization	  concerns.	   In	  appropriate	  cases,	  the	  
Civil	   Division	   should	   either	   seek	   voluntary	   dismissal	   of	   its	   claim	   or	  
actively	   oppose	   a	   settlement	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   the	   claim	  will	   harm	  
competition.208	  If,	  however,	  there	  is	  an	  antitrust	  counterclaim,	  it	  would	  
be	   appropriate	   for	   the	  United	   States	   to	   take	   the	   position	   that	   the	   in-­‐
fringement	   issue	   should	   be	   determined	   first,	   then	   reassess	   its	   view	  
during	  a	  subsequent	  antitrust	  phase.	  Similarly,	  unless	  there	  is	  evidence	  
of	  patent	  fraud,	  the	  Civil	  Division	  should	  treat	  requests	  to	  intervene	  in	  
a	   separate	   declaratory	   judgment	   action	   brought	   by	   a	   purported	   in-­‐
fringer	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  it	  examines	  a	  potential	  or	  existing	  affirma-­‐
tive	  claim.	  
These	  suggested	  approaches,	  if	  adopted,	  may	  dampen	  the	  ardor	  to	  
some	   extent,	   though	  much	   about	   patent	   litigation	  would	   not	   change.	  
There	   is,	   for	  example,	   little	  reason	   to	  believe	   that	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  
United	  States	  as	  co-­‐plaintiff	  will	  affect	  the	  statistical	  odds	  that	  a	  lawsuit	  
will	  survive	  a	  defensive	  summary	  judgment	  motion,209	  or	  that	  the	  use	  
of	  offensive	  summary	  judgment	  will	  increase.210	  Nor	  will	  cases	  brought	  
	  
invalidity.	   Likewise,	   if	   the	   court	   finds	   that	   there	   is	  no	   infringement,	   and	  a	  declaratory	   claim	  on	  
validity	  is	  pending	  or	  subsequently	  filed,	  the	  Civil	  Division	  should	  ordinarily	  oppose	  the	  request-­‐
ed	  relief.	  See	  MedImmune,	  Inc.	  v.	  Genentech,	  Inc.,	  549	  U.S.	  118,	  136	  (2007)	  (court	  has	  discretion	  
to	   hear	   claim).	   And	   the	  mere	   existence	   of	   an	   inequitable	   conduct	   defense	   should	   not	   deter	   the	  
Division	  from	  proceeding	  in	  the	  case	  or	  intervening,	  because	  courts	  require	  clear	  and	  convincing	  
evidence	   of	   intentional	   deceit.	   See	   Therasense,	   Inc.	   v.	   Becton,	   Dickinson	   &	   Co.,	   649	   F.3d	   1276,	  
1290	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2011)	  (en	  banc).	  	  	  
	   208.	   	  There	  are	  other	   issues	  related	  to	  settlements,	  which	  are	  commonplace	   in	  patent	   litiga-­‐
tion	  that	  the	  Division	  will	  need	  to	  consider.	  See,	  e.g.,	   Jay	  P.	  Kesan	  &	  Gwendolyn	  G.	  Ball,	  How	  Are	  
Patent	   Cases	   Resolved?	   An	   Empirical	   Examination	   of	   the	   Adjudication	   and	   Settlement	   of	   Patent	  
Disputes,	  84	  WASH.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  237,	  272	  &	  n.216,	  273–74	  (2006)	  (highlighting	  commonplace	  settle-­‐
ment	   issues,	   their	  probability	  of	   settlement,	  and	   indicators	   that	  parties	  are	  preparing	   to	  settle).	  
Part	  of	   the	  objection	  to	  the	   frequent	  use	  of	  so-­‐called	  “secret	  settlements”	   in	  patent	  cases	   is	   that	  
the	  settlements	  can	  shroud	  antitrust	  violations.	  Megan	  M.	  La	  Belle,	  Against	  Settlement	  of	  (Some)	  
Patent	  Cases,	  67	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  375,	  408–-­‐09	  (2014).	  Subjecting	  proposed	  settlements	  to	  FTC	  and	  
Antitrust	   Division	   review	  would	   help	   address	   that	   concern,	   but	   others,	   as	   La	   Belle	   points	   out,	  
remain,	  among	  them	  that	  a	  sealed	  settlement	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  others	  to	  ascertain	  reasonable	  
royalty	  payments.	   Id.	  at	  407–08;	  Matthew	  Sag	  &	  Kurt	  Rohde,	  Patent	  Reform	  and	  Differential	   Im-­‐
pact,	  8	  MINN.	  J.L.	  SCI.	  &	  TECH.	  1,	  83	  (2007).	  But	  objecting	  to	  such	  settlements	  might	  result	  in	  either	  
no	  settlement	  at	  all	  or	  the	  disclosure	  of	   trade	  secrets.	  See	  Robert	  Timothy	  Reagan,	  The	  Hunt	   for	  
Sealed	   Settlement	  Agreements,	   81	   CHI.-­‐KENT	   L.	   REV.	   439,	   453	   (2006).	   And	   there	   is	   little	   that	   the	  
Civil	  Division	  can	  do	  to	  prevent	  a	  patentee	  from	  using	  the	  potential	  that	  the	  United	  States	  might	  
intervene	   in	   existing	   litigation,	   or	   has	   filed	   a	   motion	   for	   intervention,	   as	   a	   bargaining	   chip	   to	  
extract	  more	  favorable	  royalty	  payments	  or	  other	  settlement	  terms.	  But	  the	  Division	  can	  certainly	  
inquire	  of	  patentees	  whether	  settlement	  negotiations	  have	  been	  ongoing	  and	  factor	  that	  into	  the	  
analysis.	  	  
	   209.	   	  See	   John	  R.	  Allison,	  Mark	  A.	  Lemley	  &	  David	  L.	  Schwartz,	  Understanding	  the	  Realities	  of	  
Modern	  Patent	  Litigation,	  92	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  1769,	  1784–-­‐85	  (2014)	  (showing	  that	  infringers	  typically	  
do	  not	  succeed	  on	  summary	  judgment).	  	  	  
	   210.	   	  Id.	  at	  1789–90.	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under	  an	  implied	  or	  inherent	  authority	  claim	  likely	  streamline	  pretrial	  
discovery,211	  impact	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  that	  actually	  go	  to	  trial,212	  or	  
affect	   the	  societal	  costs	  of	  patent	   litigation	   in	  an	  era	  of	   “litigation-­‐for-­‐
settlement.”213	  The	  Civil	  Division’s	  participation,	  albeit	  not	  as	  a	  neutral	  
party,	   could	   potentially	   assist	   courts	   in	   determining	   whether,	   in	   the	  
post-­‐eBay	   Inc.	   v.	   MercExchange,	   L.L.C.214	   environment,	   permanent	   in-­‐
junctions	  should	  be	  granted.	  The	  United	  States	  might	  articulate,	  hope-­‐
fully	   better	   than	   private	   parties	   have	   done,	   why	   the	   “public	   interest	  
would	  not	  be	  disserved”	  by	  issuance.	  That	  could	  help	  give	  shape	  to	  an	  
equitable	   factor	   that	   has	   been	   poorly	   examined	   by	   courts.215	   But	   the	  
importance	   of	   the	  United	   States	   as	   a	   plaintiff	   is	   not	   because	   its	   pres-­‐
ence	   will	   reform	   patent	   litigation	   or	   dramatically	   change	   the	   odds;	  
instead,	  it	  will	  enable	  the	  government	  to	  best	  advance	  its	  own	  interests	  
through	  instituting	  or	  intervening	  in	  infringement	  cases.	  
CONCLUSION	  
The	  United	  States	  arguably	  has	  substantial	  interests	  in	  the	  protec-­‐
tion	  of	  patent	  rights	  through	  infringement	  suits,	  not	  only	  when	  it	  is	  the	  
patentee	  or	  licensee,	  but	  also	  in	  certain	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  patent	  is	  
issued	  to	  a	  non-­‐governmental	  entity.	  For	  example,	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  
may	  exist	  when	  the	  government	  has	  placed	  emphasis	  on	  securing	  pa-­‐
tents	   for	  companies	  and	  non-­‐profits	  engaged	   in	  clean	   technologies	  or	  
other	  emerging	  and	  strategic	  sectors	  identified	  by	  Congress	  or	  the	  ex-­‐
ecutive.	  While	  this	  article	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  cabin	  the	  instances	  in	  which	  
	  
	   211.	   	  See	  James	  F.	  Holderman	  &	  Halley	  Guren,	  The	  Patent	  Litigation	  Predicament	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	   2007	   U.	   ILL.	   J.L.	   TECH.	   &	   POL’Y	   1,	   10	   (“Pretrial	   discovery	   in	   a	   patent	   case	   typically	   takes	  
several	  months	  and	  sometimes	  years.”).	  	  
	   212.	   	  Mark	  A.	   Lemley,	  Rational	   Ignorance	   at	   the	   Patent	   Office,	   95	  NW.	   U.	   L.	   REV.	   1495,	   1501	  
(2001)	   (stating	   that	   the	  number	  of	  patents	  providing	   the	  basis	  of	   lawsuits	  are	   relatively	   few	   in	  
comparison	  to	  number	  of	  patents).	  	  
	   213.	   	  Damon	   C.	   Andrews,	  Why	   Patentees	   Litigate,	   12	   COLUM.	   SCI.	   &	   TECH.	   L.	   REV.	   219,	   223	  
(2011)	   (describing	  development	  of	   “litigation-­‐for-­‐settlement”	  mentality	  and	  why	   it	  has	  come	   to	  
dominate	  decisions	  to	  engage	  in	  patent	  infringement	  litigation	  and	  outcomes).	  	  
	   214.	   	  eBay	   Inc.	   v.	   MercExchange,	   L.L.C.,	   547	   U.S.	   388	   (2006).	   See	   Mark	   P.	   Gergen,	   John	   M.	  
Golden	   &	   Henry	   E.	   Smith,	   The	   Supreme	   Court’s	   Accidental	   Revolution?	   The	   Test	   for	   Permanent	  
Injunctions,	  112	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  203,	  204–05	  (2012)	   (discussing	   impact	  of	  decision’s	  adoption	  of	  
traditional	  four-­‐prong	  equitable	  test	  for	  injunctions).	  	  
	   215.	   	  Liza	  Vertinsky	  details	  the	  relatively	  small	  weight	  given	  by	  post-­‐eBay	  courts	  to	  the	  public	  
interest	  prong.	   Liza	   S.	  Vertinsky,	  Making	  Room	   for	  Cooperative	   Innovation,	   41	  FLA.	   ST.	  U.	   L.	  REV.	  
1067,	  1105–06	  (2014).	  This	  does	  not	  suggest,	  however,	  that	  the	  Justice	  Department	  should	  uni-­‐
formly	  endorse	  permanent	  injunctions	  whenever	  it	  acts	  as	  a	  co-­‐plaintiff.	  The	  Civil	  Division	  should	  
coordinate	   with	   the	   Solicitor	   General’s	   office	   and	   interested	   agencies	   on	   macro-­‐	   and	   micro-­‐
strategy	  given	  the	  myriad	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  issuance	  of	  injunctive	  relief.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Golden,	  supra	  
note	  18,	  at	  578–82	  (discussing	  potential	  pro-­‐injunction	  presumptions);	  Thomas	  F.	  Cotter,	  Patent	  
Holdup,	  Patent	  Remedies,	  and	  Antitrust	  Responses,	  34	  J.	  CORP.	  L.	  1151,	  1179	  (2009)	  (arguing	  gen-­‐
eral	  principle	  of	  awarding	  injunctive	  relief	  should	  not	  be	  followed	  in	  every	  instance).	  
520	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  
the	   Justice	   Department	   should	   give	   serious	   examination	   to	   filing	   an	  
infringement	   action	   as	   a	   co-­‐plaintiff	   or	   by	   intervening	   as	   of	   right	   in	  
existing	  litigation	  concerning	  a	  private	  patent,	  it	  has	  discussed	  a	  means	  
by	  which	  identified	  government	  interests	  in	  private	  patent	  enforceabil-­‐
ity	  can,	  in	  the	  most	  effective	  manner,	  be	  advanced.	  
	  
